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Abstract
The psychometric properties of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) have been
criticized. Although it has been the gold standard in research and assessment,
its reliability (Le., internal consistency) has been questioned. There are doubts
about its ability to identifY accurately the underlying factors for anxiety
sensitivity. To provide a more accurate description of the anxiety sensitivity
construct, Taylor and Cox (1998) developed the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile
(ASP) and performed analyses based on a sample of 349 university students.
The current study utilized a clinical sample to test the hypotheses that the ASP
would have convergent validity with the ASI and discriminant validity with
the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAl). This
correlational study was conducted with a clinical sample of 105 adults, 19 to
65 years old, who have an anxiety disorder. Each subject completed the ASP,
ASI, STAl, and the computerized version of the SClD-IfP. Results supported
the hypotheses. Large correlations at the .01 level were found for the ASP
and ASI total scores and ASP subscale scores. Modest correlations were
found for the ASI and ASP total and subscale scores and the trait version of
the STAl at the .05 leveL Reliability (internal consistency) for the ASI total
scores and ASP subscales was high. Therefore this study provides evidence
for convergent validity with the ASI. It also provides necessary, although not
sufficient evidence for construct validity for the ASP subscales. Internal
consistency reliability cannot be determined for all of the underlying domains
of the ASI, because one of the domains consists of only one item. This
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evidence implies that the ASP is psychometrically superior to the ASI for
research and treatment. Instead of the three underlying factors of the ASI, six
factors are implied. Evidence is provided through convergent validity and
internal consistency reliability found for the six ASP subscales. It is
speculated that utilization of the ASP will support improved consistency in
research through the use of congruence (i.e., matching the symptoms caused
by a provocation task and the symptoms a person fears). Furthennore the
ASP wil1 support accurate identification of the domains underlying anxiety
sensitivity that contribute to its association with all anxiety disorders. Finally,
there are applied implications. These include the fact that those at risk can be
identified and given brief cognitive-behavioral therapy as a preventive
intervention. Also, treatment can target congruent cognitions, and elevated
anxiety sensitivity at the end of treatment can be targeted for further
interventions.
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Chapter One: Literature Review
Introduction

Attempts are being made to discover the factors involved in the etiology of
anxiety pathology (Silverman & Weems, 1999). The goals of these attempts are the
identification of individuals at risk and the application of appropriate preventive
treatments to arrest the development of pathological anxiety. One risk factor is the
construct referred to as anxiety sensitivity. It is currently viewed as an important,
inherited predisposition for anxiety disorders in general and panic disorder in particular
(Taylor & Cox, 1998). Initial studies have examined this construct in relation to
prevention, treatment improvement, and maintenance of treatment gains with panic
disorder (Otto &

Reilly~Harrington,

1999).

The purpose of this paper will be to discuss some of the major themes regarding
the anxiety sensitivity construct. Before entering into a description of the studies
mentioned above, as well as the current study, the theoretical background for anxiety
sensitivity is presented. This will include a discussion of the new conceptual
developments that have been necessitated by challenges to the initial theory. Among
these are the identification of a multifactorial structure and the number and identification
of underlying domains. In addition, the part played by anxiety sensitivity in the etiology
and maintenance of anxiety disorders will be discussed. This will include the role played
by anxiety sensitivity, not only in panic disorder, but in other anxiety disorders as welL
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From its initial conception, anxiety sensitivity has been defined as the fear of
anxiety and anxiety-related symptoms (Reiss, 1987; Reiss & McNally, 1985; Reiss,
Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). It has been hypothesized that those who fear the
effects of anxiety on bodily sensations and cognitive processes believe there might be
negative social (e.g., rejection due to visible signs such as shaking), physical (e.g.,
suffocation due to changes in respiration), or psychological results (e.g., losing their
minds due to a decreased ability to concentrate; Zinbarg, Barlow, & Brown, 1997). It has
been identified, in the negative effects of elevated anxiety sensitivity, as a factor related
to panic disorder and to a lesser extent to the other anxiety disorders, with the possible
exception of specific phobia (McNally & Lorenz, 1987; Reiss & McNally, 1985).
There have been challenges along the way in developing an understanding of the
anxiety sensitivity construct. Meeting these challenges through continuing research is a
necessary step for a well developed theoretical concept. The initial focus of this paper is
on expectancy theory, which is the earliest attempt to provide a theoretical framework for
the construct. According to this theory, anxiety sensitivity is perceived as one of three
fundamental fears with a unifactorial structure that cannot be reduced to more specific
fears. Anxiety sensitivity has also been viewed as a multifactorial concept that consists
of at least four dimensions (i.e., anxiety sensitivity and at least three underlying factors;
Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1996; Taylor, 1996). Other aspects of expectancy theory
have been questioned. For example, according to expectancy theory, anxiety sensitivity
is a fear (Reiss, 1991). However, it has also been argued that it is not a fear, but possibly
a variable that moderates fear, avoidance, and panic. Others have provided initial support
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for the role of anxiety sensitivity as a partial mediator for panic (Stewart, Taylor, lang,
Cox, Watt, Fedoroff, & Borger, 2001).
Proceeding further with the multifactorial concept, investigators who subscribe to
that view have not firmly established the number and identity of the underlying factors of
anxiety sensitivity. Previously existing measures of this construct were not created to
evaluate possible lower order factors (Cox, Borger, & Enns, 1999; Taylor & Cox, 1998;
Taylor, Rabian, & Fedoroff, 1999). Although three factors (Le., physical concerns,
mental incapacitation concerns, and social concerns) have been identified with the
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Zinbarg et aI., 1997), two studies have provided initial
evidence for the existence of six factors (Taylor & Cox, 1998; Van der Does, Duijsens,
Eurelings-Bontekoe, Verschuur, Spinhoven, 2003) based upon the six domains found in
previous studies (Taylor, 1996). These results suggest that the three factor model may be
an artifact caused by utilization ofthe ASI, which was not designed to explore the
multifactorial structure of anxiety sensitivity (Taylor et aI., 1999).
There are additional questions about the identification of the factors composing
anxiety sensitivity, using the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI). The factor labeled as the
fear of observable reactions to anxiety has often been found in factor-analytic studies of
the AS!. However, the fear of negative evaluation, a theoretical construct that is part of
the expectancy theory framework, may be too heavily represented in some of the original
ASI items (Cox et ai. 1999). In some studies, experts advocate for the deletion of the
items that assess the fear of negative evaluation (e.g., "It embarrasses me when my
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stomach growls"; Taylor, 1995a; Taylor, Koch, & Crockett, 1991; Taylor, Koch,
McNally, & Crockett, 1992).
In related research, evidence has been found for a hierarchical structure for the
anxiety sensitivity construct using the ASI and factor analysis. Because of the choices
made by investigators to focus on either the upper or lower level or to make no
differentiation between higher and lower level factors, results have been contradictory.
Because distinct factors may be linked to distinct mechanisms (Cattell, 1978), for
instance, in the etiology of anxiety reactions, accurately establishing the validity of the
AS construct, its measures, and the factors which make up the structure is important
(Zinbarg, Mohlman, & Hong, 1999).
Turning next to the etiology of anxiety symptoms, there has been a growing body
of evidence for the presence of elevated anxiety sensitivity across anxiety disorders. To
understand the etiology of panic, it was initially, and continues to be important to explore
the role that anxiety sensitivity plays in the development of panic attacks. With this
exploration has come an agreement of theoretical and empirical efforts of the past 20
years that anxiety sensitivity occupies a principal position in the disposition and etiology
of anxiety disorders in general and panic disorder in particular (Barlow, 1988, 1991;
Clark, 1986; Goldstein & Chambless, 1987; McNally, 1990; Reiss, 1991; Reiss &
McNally, 1985; Reiss et a1. 1986; Zinbarg et aI., 1997; Zinbarg et aI., 1999;).
Related research has sought to examine evidence for predisposition and
environmental learning for elevated anxiety sensitivity. A small part of these
investigations has focused on the exploration of the roles played by interpretive,
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attentional, memory, interoceptive acuity, and cognitive biases in the online processing of
anxiety sensations. At the present time, results of these investigations have been quite
inconsistent. With the goals of understanding etiology and the development of improved
assessment and preventive treatment in mind, it is important to know whether or not
individuals who are at risk for the development of panic and other anxiety disorders have
the same biases as those who currently experience the symptoms of those disorders
(McNally, 1999).
Other issues of etiology include the relationships of the anxiety sensitivity
construct with the broader personality domains found in several theoretical models of
personality. Recently there has been some focus on the relationships between anxiety
sensitivity and the personality domains of neuroticism (J\ffi) and trait anxiety (Eysenck,
1991; Reiss, 1997). A recent study that included the ASP (Van der Does et aI., 2003)
identified a significant relationship between AS and avoidance of harm, an underlying
factor of the higher order dimension of Constraint (CN; Tellegen, 1978/1982; Tellegen &
Waller, 1994).
The most widely used instrument to assess anxiety sensitivity in the previously
mentioned investigations has been the

16~item

Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Peterson

& Reiss, 1992). The ASI is the gold standard. It has been shown to produce reliable

scores, and to differentiate between panic disorder patients and patients with other
psychiatric disorders, including anxiety disorders (Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992).
Furthermore, ASI scores predict the occurrence of panic attacks in healthy individuals
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during a highly stressful period (Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997; Schmidt, Lerew, &
Jackson, 1999).
As previously mentioned, the question of whether or not anxiety sensitivity is

uni~

or multidimensional has been controversial (Lilienfeld, Turner, & Jacob, 1993; McNally,
1996). This question is important because if anxiety sensitivity is in fact
multidimensional, relationships between a global measure of anxiety sensitivity and other
variables may be obscured. For instance, the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and
response to carbon dioxide challenge may be less strong than the relationship between an
assumed but unproven anxiety sensitivity dimension (i.e., suffocation fear) and response
to carbon dioxide challenge. Research findings in this area seemed to be inconsistent,
with about half the number of studies supporting the unidimensional view and half
supporting the multidimensionaL However, it has been shown that a hierarchical model
of anxiety sensitivity, as measured by the ASI, consisting of three partially distinct firstorder factors and one general second-order factor, resolves these inconsistencies (Zinbarg
et al. 1999). The three first-order factors are: (1) physical concerns, (2) mental
incapacitation concerns, and (3) social concerns (Zinbarg et aL 1999). However, the
results of factor analysis depend heavily on the comprehensiveness of the measurements.
The ASI has only 16 items and may be too short to assess reliably the separate
dimensions of anxiety sensitivity (Cox, Parker, & Swinson, 1996). In fact, the three
factor model may be an artifact. It has also been argued that the ASI contains a number of
problematic items (Blais, Otto, & Zucker, 2001). A re~analysis of previous studies
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showed that an II-item ASI with only two subscales might be a more precise index of
anxiety sensitivity (Blais et al., 2001).
Due to the apparent limitations of the ASI, the development of more
psychometrically sound measures of anxiety sensitivity is criticaL As every clinician
knows, common catastrophic cognitions of patients with panic disorder include more than
two or three themes (e.g., fear of heart failure, suffocation fear, fear oflosing control, fear
of fainting, or fear of acting ridiculous). Furthermore, some patients believe that their
symptoms cause future damage (Van der Does et aL, 2003). Considering the importance
of the concept of anxiety sensitivity for cognitive theory, the number and nature of firstorder anxiety sensitivity dimensions is not trivial. It would be interesting, for instance, to
determine whether or not different anxiety sensitivity profiles exist for patients who
present at a cardiology department with atypical chest pain, for patients who are seen by
neurologists for unexplainable dizziness, and for patients who consult pulmonologists
because of attacks of breathlessness. Because only a small minority of these patients
have DSM-IV panic disorder (Pollack, Kradin, Otto, Worthington, Gould, Sabatino, &
Rosenbaum,

1996~

Worthington, Pollack, Otto, Gould, Sabatino, Goldman, &

Rosenbaum, 1997; Van Peski-Oosterbaan, Spinhoven, Van der Does, Wi1lems, & Sterk;
1996; Van Peski-Oosterbaan, Spinhoven, Van der Does, Bruschke, & Rooijmans, 1999),
these populations may constitute examples of single-dimension anxiety sensitivity
elevations (Van der Does et aI., 2003),
In an attempt to measure six dimensions of anxiety sensitivity identified across
studies (Taylor, 1996), Taylor & Cox (1998) created a new measure, the 60-item Anxiety
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Sensitivity Profile (ASP). The ASP was designed to measure the following six
dimensions: fear of (1) cardiovascular symptoms, (2) respiratory symptoms, (3)
gastrointestinal symptoms, (4) neurological/dissociative symptoms, (5) publicly
observable anxiety symptoms, and (6) cognitive dyscontroi. However, a factor analytic
study with 349 college students revealed four dimensions and one second-order general
dimension of anxiety sensitivity (Taylor & Cox, 1998). The four dimensions were fear of
(1) respiratory symptoms, (2) cognitive dyscontrol, (3) gastrointestinal symptoms, and (4)
cardiac symptoms. In comparison with the ASI factors (Zinbarg et aI., 1999), physical
concerns split into three dimensions and there is no dimension for social concerns. The
appropriateness of this 4-dimensional model is questionable, however, since the
eigenvalue plot indicated a one- or two-dimensional structure (Van der Does et aI., 2003).
This measure may be psychometrically superior to the ASI because it has been
designed to address the issues previously presented. All the items in the ASP appear to
be specific to the anxiety sensitivity construct. In addition, the ASP has a sufficient
number of items to establish internal consistency reliability and convergent validity for
each scale. These are steps that are necessary, although not sufficient, to establish the
construct validity of a measure. A sufficient number of items on each scale will also
increase the possibility that the lower-order factors of anxiety sensitivity will be more
accurately identified (Taylor & Cox, 1998). However, given that this measure has been
examined in only one study with a non-clinical sample, generalizability needs to be
established through the completion of additional studies with a clinical population
(Kazdin, 1998). The college student sample used by Taylor and Cox (1998) has serious
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limitations. It is a highly selective sample, particularly in regard to the restricted range
of age and education and the expected range of ASP scores (Blais et al. 2001; Van der
Does et aI., 2003). In fact, the ASP item distributions were so skewed that they had to be
log-transfonned before further analysis could be performed (Taylor & Cox, 1998; Van
der Does et aI., 2003). A replication of this study in a more diverse population seems
warranted before making any conclusions regarding the number of dimensions of the
ASP (Van der Does et at, 2003).
This study addresses this issue through the use of a varied clinical sample
consisting of individuals who have one or more anxiety disorders. This study seeks to
establish further the reliability and validity of their instrument with a clinical population.
It is important that these be established. By seeking also to provide evidence of

convergent validity for the ASP with a clinical sample, this study may provide further
support for the efforts of Taylor and Cox (1998), who are attempting to improve the
understanding of the AS construct through their development ofa measure (i.e., ASP)
that may provide a more comprehensive identification of the underlying factors of
anxiety sensitivity. This study will provide analyses that may establish convergent and
divergent validity for the ASP. Convergent validity may be established through a high
correlation with the ASI, the gold standard in measurement of the anxiety sensitivity
construct.

In addition, this study may provide support for the concept that anxiety sensitivity
is a multifactorial, rather than unifactorial construct. Additional support for the existence
of six underlying factors, including the fear of observable reactions to anxiety, may be
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provided. Evidence that may be provided for reliability and validity ofthis construct
might provide further evidence that anxiety sensitivity is not an artifact of another
construct such as the fear of pain, or another trait. Consistent with previous
investigations, the results of this investigation may provide further proof that individuals
with other anxiety disorders also have elevated anxiety sensitivity. And finally, the
current study may provide evidence that the ASP is a psychometrically superior
instrument which can support accurate lower level factor identification and construct
validity for the anxiety sensitivity general factor.

Theoretical Background and Rationale

Theoretical Background

Expectancy theory. Expectancy theory is the earliest attempt to provide a
theoretical framework linking anxiety sensitivity as a causal factor to fear. anxiety, panic,
and avoidance behavior (Reiss, 1980, 1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985; Taylor & Fedoroff,
1999). This theory was constructed to provide an understanding of the part that anxiety
sensitivity plays in the impact of anxiety on people's functioning (Taylor & Fedoroff,
1999). Central to the framework provided by expectancy theory are three fundamental
fears or sensitivities: (a) anxiety sensitivity, (b) the fear of illness, injury, and death, and,
( c) the fear of negative evaluation (Reiss, 1991). This core has more recently been
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modified and expanded (Reiss & Havercamp, 1996, 1997), but the main concept has been
retained. According to current expectancy theory, anxiety sensitivity is still viewed as a
fundamental fear, and with the other fundamental fears, increases fear, anxiety, and
panic. It must be noted, however, that at the present time it has not been established that
anxiety sensitivity is distinguishable from the fear of pain, or other fundamental fears
(Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999). Neither has anxiety sensitivity been established as a cause of
fear, anxiety, panic, and avoidance behavior.
In addition to fundamental fears, Reiss (1991) identified a second distinct
category of fear, which he refers to as common fears. The criteria by which he
differentiates these two categories are: (a) most people would describe exposure to
stimuli that cause a fundamental fear as a negative experience, but the same cannot be
said of common fears and (b) common fears such as fears of hannless animals, situations
(e.g., heights, enclosed spaces) and social fears (e.g., public speaking, eating in public;
Reiss, 1991), are based on fundamental fears. Thus, according to this theory, it appears
that fundamental fears exist on a continuum that begins in the range of normal experience
and increases to become problematic for some individuals. Common fears, on the other
hand, are apparently linked to the continuum for the fundamental fears and affect the
individual when their fundamental fears are in the problematic range.
In addition to these two criteria, fundamental fears cause the fear of a large
number of stimuli while common fears do not. For example, an individual with a high
level of anxiety sensitivity might have more than the normal fear of a nwnber of
situations, such as exposure to hannless snakes or to heights. These are situations that
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the individual suspects will cause the experience of panic. They are feared because he or
she has more than the normal fear of the possible occurrence ofa panic attack during
exposure to these situations (Reiss, 1991). To explain further, anxiety sensitivity is
described as the fear of anxiety and the symptoms of anxiety, and therefore, the fear of
having a panic attack would be perceived as the fundamental fear. The fear of specific
situations (i.e., common fears) is the result of the interaction of fundamental fears and
learning experiences (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).
When fundamental fears interact with learning experiences, individuals may
acquire common fears, or fears that the individual had previously acquired may acquire
additional strength (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999). Central to this process are three forms of
learning: (a) traumatic conditioning experiences, (b) observational learning, and (c)
learning from verbal information regarding the threat of specific stimuli (Rachman,
1990). An illustration of this would be the acquisition of dog phobia by the individual
who has been mauled by a dog. The fundamental fear of illness/injury/death sensitivity
becomes connected with dogs (i.e., common fear) and anything that reminds the
individual of dogs (i.e., learning). In addition, this fear may be increased by other
fundamental fears, such as anxiety sensitivity. In this case the individual is also fearful of
the anxiety that the dog evokes (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).

Does anxiety sensitivity meet the criteria of a fundamental fear? Anxiety
sensitivity appears to meet the first of the criteria for fundamental fears (i.e., most people
find exposure to certain stimuli to be a negative experience). Most people taking part in
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studies using the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Peterson & Reiss, 1987), currently the most
frequently used measure of anxiety sensitivity, have indicated they have some fear of
anxiety. Only a small number of people indicate an absence of this fear (Taylor &
Fedoroff, 1999). The findings for a sample of 818 university students illustrated this
point with only four students (0.5%) reporting a score of zero on the ASI (Stewart,
Taylor, & Baker, 1997).
The second criterion is that common fears are based on, and can be logically
reduced to, fundamental fears. The manner in which this is described has been illustrated
in a number of published studies (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999). For example, for
individuals with high anxiety sensitivity, a fundamental fear, the fear of panic attacks is
triggered by exposure to animals; this was found to be the main reason that some animal
phobics were fearful of certain animals (McNally & Steketee, 1985). Those with the
fundamental illnesslinjury/death sensitivity, which centered on the phobia of flying, were
afraid that the plane would crash. Individuals with agoraphobia feared flying due to a
fear of having a panic attack at some point during the flight due to anxiety sensitivity
(McNally & Louro, 1992; Reiss, 1991).
Questions have arisen with the examination of two important components that are
part of the second criterion for a fundamental fear (Reiss, 1991): (a) anxiety sensitivity
must be distinguishable from other feat:,s in order to be considered a fundamental fear,
and (b) anxiety sensitivity cannot be further reduced to fears that are even more basic.
These concepts have received mixed support in recent studies. Pertaining to the first
concept, a factor analytic study using community volunteers as a sample found that
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anxiety sensitivity was factorially distinct from illness/injury/death sensitivity and from
the fear of negative evaluation (Taylor, 1993). Further evidence that anxiety sensitivity is
factorially distinct from other fundamental fears was provided by factor analytic studies
of mentally retarded samples in terms of Reiss' expanded list of sensitivities (Reiss &
Havercamp, 1996, 1997). However, anxiety sensitivity overlaps with the fear of pain in
other samples (Reiss & Havercamp, 1996, 1997), raising some doubt as to the ability of
anxiety sensitivity to fulfill the requirements of the second criterion.
According to the second concept, as long as anxiety sensitivity cannot be reduced
to more basic fears, it can be regarded as fundamentaL There is growing evidence
regarding this concept, which raises further doubt that anxiety sensitivity meets the
requirements of the second criterion. In these studies using the ASI, anxiety sensitivity
has been shown to consist of three correlated factors: (a) the fear of somatic sensations,
(b) the fear of the loss of cognitive control, and (c) the fear of anxiety reactions that are
observable by others. It has been proposed that other factors underlie even these (i.e.,
fear of death, insanity, and negative evaluation; Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999). If part of the
purpose of expectancy theory is to provide a framework that explains the nature of
anxiety sensitivity as a construct, it will need further development that takes into account
these findings regarding factorial distinction and more basic underlying fears.
The opinion has been expressed that factorial distinction is not a criteria that
would imply the identification of anxiety sensitivity as a fear, rather than as a variable
moderating fear (e.g., anxiety and depression are distinct, but correlated, and one would
not call depression a form of anxiety). S. Taylor (personal communication, November
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26,2001) reported that the relationships of phenomena such as anxiety and depression
could be perceived in several ways. First, he described contexts in which anxiety and
anxiety sensitivity play the role of moderating variable. For example, according to the
complication model, depression can arise as a consequence or result of anxiety. Evidence,
which is reported in a later section, supports the prediction of important phenomena by
anxiety sensitivity after controlling for various confounding factors. For example,
anxiety sensitivity plays a moderating role as it predicts panic attacks after controlling for
trait anxiety. He also described contexts in which anxiety and depression are correlated
factors. According to the common diathesis model, anxiety and depression are correlated
because they are the results of some shared common factor, such as the personality trait
of negative affectivity (i.e., the tendency to experience negative emotions). It is also quite
possible that other emotional phenomena share an inherited predisposition with anxiety
sensitivity. These could again be personality traits such as negative affectivity, which is
discussed in a later section.
Concerning the concept of anxiety sensitivity as a variable moderating or
mediating fear rather than being a fundamental fear, S. Taylor (personal communication,
November 26, 200 I) reported that anxiety sensitivity may be both; it may be in some
sense a fundamental fear and it also appears to influence other fears. Anxiety sensitivity
is not fundamental in any absolute sense, because it can be decomposed into components
(e.g., its factors, which, in tum, are influenced by more basic factors such as
environmental and genetic detenninants). The more important question is whether or not
anxiety sensitivity predicts or causes important phenomena, and the evidence points
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toward its mediational role. T. Brown (personal communication, November 25,2001)
reported that the conceptual thinking about anxiety sensitivity is that early experiences
(e.g., parental modeling) result in anxiety sensitivity, which in tum may result in panic.
Specifically, the assertion that childhood learning has a direct effect on anxiety sensitivity
is not necessarily claimed by a moderated relationship, but is more likely to be that of a
mediated relationship.
On one hand, as S. Taylor suggests (personal communication, November 26,

2001), it is possible to conceptualize anxiety sensitivity as a moderator variable of other
fears. For example, anxiety sensitivity has been found to be present in social phobia and
perhaps its presence and its level of intensity increase symptoms such as avoidance
behavior that are related to the fear of negative evaluation. However, returning to a
possible mediational role for anxiety sensitivity, one study has already claimed a partial
mediational role for anxiety sensitivity for panic attacks. Stewart et al. (2001) found in a
retrospective study that learning history for arousal-reactive somatic symptoms (i.e.,
nausea, racing heart, shortness of breath, and dizziness) directly influenced both anxiety
sensitivity levels and panic frequency, and that anxiety sensitivity directly influenced
panic frequency. Stewart et al. (2001) stated that learning history is an indirect cause of
panic frequency, another requirement of the mediational relationship, as reported by T.
Brown (personal communication, November 25,2001). However, as T. Brown (2001)
and Stewart et al. (2001) cautioned, this is a cross-sectional study, which cannot really
address conditions of mediation because it evaluates a cross-sectional pattern of
correlations, and cannot firmly establish causality.
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Expectancy theory and an..t:iety expectancies,- Anxiety sensitivity and the larger
theoretical framework of anxiety expectancy were also developed as an attempt to
explain individual differences regarding the development of common fears (Reiss, 1980,
1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985). Through what appears to be a mediational role (Le.,
through a certain relation or mechanism, A leads to B), expectancy theory attempts to
provide a link between the individual's fundamental fears and his or her assumptions of a
negative outcome in specific situations. This approach emphasizes not only experiences
of direct conditioning, but also focuses on the individual acquiring outcome expectancies,
possibly through observational learning and verbal information regarding threat. The
conditioned stimulus becomes linked with the expectation that the unconditioned
stimulus will take place (Davey, 1992). This concept shares an emphasis on expectations
with neo-conditioning theory (Rachman, 1991; Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999). In fact,
expectancy theory was conceived through the extension of the neo-conditioning approach
(Reiss, 1980, 1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985), which explains in detail the creation of
fear-related responses, including anxiety, pamc, avoidance, and escape behavior, through
the combination of anxiety sensitivity and anxiety expectancies. Each individual's
expectations and sensitivities combine to produce his or her responses to fear (Taylor &
Fedoroff, 1999).
Each individual's expectations are his or her beliefs about what will take place
when he or she is exposed to the feared object or situation. Examples of such
expectations pertaining to each ofthe three fundamental fears or sensitivities are the
belief that the plane will crash and all on board will either die or be severely disabled, the
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expectation of having a panic attack during the flight, and the belief that other people will
notice his or her fear of flying and negative evaluation by others will follow (Reiss,
1991). The underlying causes for fearing the foreseen event are the three fundamental
sensitivities, also referred to as fundamental fears. Examples of these causes are the
individual's belief that he or she cannot stand the thought of being handicapped, that
panic attacks cause heart attacks, and the belief that it would be horrible if people were to
laugh or think he or she is stupid when they notice the individual? s fear of flying (Reiss,
1991). According to this theory there is a great variety of differences in sensitivities
among individuals. Anxiety sensitivi ty is a person-specific factor and danger and anxiety
expectancies are situation-specific factors (Reiss & McNally, 1985). The individual
possesses anxiety sensitivity, which interacts with the expectation of danger that is
specific to the situation.

Fear. anxiety. and avoidance. Expectancy theory seeks to identifY and explain
the interactions that cause pathological anxiety. To identifY the possible interactions that
resuJt in fear, anxiety, and avoidance. six variables are perceived as having an influence
on common fears (e.g., fear of heights). These are (a) the expectation of actual danger or
disaster (e.g.; the individual's expectation that he or she might fall while looking over the

cliff edge), (b) anxiety expectancy (e.g., the individual's expectation that he or she will
panic), (c) social disaster expectation (e.g., the expectation that people willlaugh at the
individual if they see that he or she is fearful of heights), (d) sensitivity to injury, illness,
and death (e.g., the beHefthat it would be terrible to faU), (e) anxiety sensitivity (e.g. the
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fear of anxiety and anxiety-related symptoms), and (f) negative evaluation sensitivity
(e.g., the individual's belief that it would be catastrophic to experience people laughing at
him or her; Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).
When the person is exposed to his or her ordinary, but feared situation, the level
of fear or anxiety experienced by the person, as suggested by the model, is partially
decided by the interaction between anxiety sensitivity and the person's expectations of
anxiety. The components of the individual's anxiety reaction that can be linked to a fear
situation are not clear in Reiss' theory (e.g., shaking, rapid heart beating; Taylor &
Fedoroff, 1999). It is possible that it refers to the individual's belief about the intensity of
anxiety or fear that will be reached if exposure to the feared object or situation continues
(Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).

The Expectancy Theory ofFear

Proposed revisions for expectancy theory have been necessitated by closer
examination of the experience of individuals with pathological anxiety and the evidence
for the existence of lower-order factors for anxiety sensitivity. The following studies
have given rise to additional interesting questions about the theory. The first of these
involves the assumption that anxiety expectancies (ie., the expectations of arousal) are
empirically different from danger expectancies (i.e., the expectations of objective
disaster). Scales were developed to assess both expectancies in order to test this view
with three fears: (a) fear of flying, (b) fear of heights, and (c) fear of public speaking
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(Gursky & Reiss, 1987). One hundred thirty-five college students completed the scales
and the results were factor analyzed. The assumption was supported by findings of a
two-factor solution for each fear in which danger and anxiety expectancies represent
separate factors (Gursky & Reiss, 1987; Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).
The fact that fear arises from the interaction between expectancies and
sensitivities is another assumption for which three studies produced relevant results
(Schoenberger, Kirsch, & Rosengard, 1991). Ninety-four college students, who feared
snakes, were asked to approach and touch a live, harmless snake. Subjects rated danger
expectancy, anxiety expectancy, and self-reported fear, completing measures of danger
sensitivity (i.e., illness/injury/death sensitivity) and anxiety sensitivity. The prediction of
self-reported fear was obtained through hierarchical regression analyses. As the
regression coefficient for expected danger grew smaller, the danger sensitivity scores
went higher, which suggests that these results are exactly opposite from those suggested
by Reiss' expectancy theory (Schoenberger et at, 1991).
In a related study, one hundred seventeen college students who were fearful of
enclosed spaces were asked to walk down a long, narrow, darkened dead-end corridor
(Valentiner, TeIch, IJai, & Hehmsoth, 1993). Significant predictors of avoidance
behavior, as measured by the amount of time spent in the corridor, were danger
expectancy, anxiety expectancy, and the interaction between anxiety sensitivity and
anxiety expectancy. On the other hand, heart rate and self-reports of fear were not
predicted by these variables. An older version of the expectancy theory was tested in this
study (Reiss, 1980; Reiss & McNally, 1985), in which fear is determined by danger
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expectancy and the anxiety sensitivity-by-anxiety expectancy interaction. The newer
version (Reiss, 1991) proposes that fear is detennined by three expectancy-by-sensitivity
interactions. Nevertheless, the view that fear responding is a function of the interaction
between anxiety sensitivity and anxiety expectancy receives only limited support from
the results (ie., only avoidance behavior was predicted; Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999;
Valentiner et aI., 1993).
In a study which explored the interaction between anxiety sensitivity and anxiety
expectancy (TeIch & Harrington, 1994), thirty-nine high anxiety sensitivity and 40 low
anxiety sensitivity college students were asked to inhale a harmless mixture of35%
carbon dioxide and 65% oxygen. This compound is a strong panic inducer for people
with high anxiety sensitivity because it causes bodily sensations that are related to
anxiety arousal (McNally, 1996). Subjects were told to expect either a state of relaxation
or a state of arousal. Inhalation-induced panic attacks were most frequent among high
anxiety sensitivity subjects in the expect-relaxation condition (52%), compared with high
anxiety sensitivity subjects in the expect-arousal condition (17%). Ratings for inhalationinduced fear were similar. Therefore, the findings were directly opposite to those
predicted by the expectancy theory (i.e., a negative interaction between anxiety
sensitivity and anxiety expectancy; TeIch & Harrington, 1994). It is possible that in
further revisions ofthis theory (Taylor and Fedoroff, 1999), the match or mismatch
between what is expected and what actually occurs needs to be considered. It is also
possible that other variables influenced the outcome. Perhaps high anxiety sensitivity
su~jects

who expected arousal had a sense of safety or freedom from harm because the
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arousal symptoms were being artificially induced, rather than caused by cardiac arrest,
respiratory dysfunction, or the loss of mental capacity.
To summarize, expectancy theory has been tested in only a handful of studies, and
none of these studies has tested the full theory. Even at that, doubts about the adequacy
of the theory have been raised by the results of these studies (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999),
and they have not yet been addressed. For example, despite recent evidence that
establishes the existence of at least three underlying factors for anxiety sensitivity,
expectancy theory has not been expanded. It is possible that new, sophisticated modeling
techniques will support the currently evolving conceptual models to the point that they
will prove expectancy theory obsolete, or that the theory will be modified to include the
new conceptualizations. With these new techniques, anxiety sensitivity will be more
accurately identified as a variable. At the present time, anxiety sensitivity has been found
to be useful as a predictor of, and risk factor for, panic, as well as playing a role across
anxiety disorders. Of course, the importance of the theoretical conception is ultimately to
inform clinical application. The folIowing discussion will explore the role that anxiety
sensitivity plays in the initiation and development of anxiety pathology. This section win
promote an understanding of the fit of the present theoretical work with research efforts
aimed at prevention and refinement of treatment.
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The Possible Role ofAnxiety ~ensitivity in the Etiology and Maintenance ofAnxiety
Disorders

Sources of the fear of anxiety:.. This section will begin with a brief overview of the
development of anxiety sensitivity. Anxiety sensitivity and relevant constructs, (e.g., the
fear of fear), have been given, by agreement of theoretical and empirical efforts of the
past 20 years, a principal position in the disposition and etiology of anxiety disorders in
general, and panic disorder in particular (Barlow, 1988,1991; Clark, 1986; Goldstein &
Chambless, 1978; McNally, 1990; Reiss, 1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985; Reiss et aI.,
1986; Zinbarg et aI., 1999;). Anxiety sensitivity is perceived to be a trait-like
characteristic that exists before the development of pathological anxiety. Individual
differences in anxiety are developed by the interaction of anxiety sensitivity with a
number of varied experiences, leading to a collection of beliefs about the harmful results
of anxiety arousal. Utilizing social learning theory, the individual is perceived as
becoming fearful of the sensations of anxiety arousal through spoken and observational
means (e.g., hearing others express fear of such sensations, receiving misinformation
about the harmfulness of certain sensations, witnessing a catastrophic event such as the
fatal heart attack of a loved one; Schmidt, Lerew, & Joiner, 1998); fears, however, can
also develop through direct conditioning (i.e., the Pavlovian interoceptive formulation~
Rachman, 1977). Therefore, from the anxiety sensitivity point of view, the individual can
develop a fear of anxiety not only from direct experience with panic, but by other means
as well (McNally, 1990). A high score on the ASI does not require the experience of
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unexpected (e,g., Donnell & McNally, 1990) or expected (e.g" Cox, Endler, Norton, &
Swinson, 1991) panic attacks (McNally, 1999),
Because the occurrence of panic can be preceded by elevated anxiety sensitivity,
anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor for anxiety disorders in general and panic disorder in
particular (Reiss & McNally, 1985; McNally & Lorenz, 1987), This hypothesis has been
confirmed in several studies. In an important longitudinal study, using a sample of cadets
at the US, Air Force Academy during basic training (Schmidt et al., 1997), it was
demonstrated that the occurrence of spontaneous panic attacks and anxiety symptoms
were predicted by elevated ASI scores (Peterson & Reiss, 1987). Using a nonclinical
sample of 151 college students assessed with the ASI, a three year follow-up study was
conducted with a subsample of23 high anxiety sensitivity subjects and 25 low anxiety
sensitivity subjects (Maller & Reiss, 1992). The frequency and intensity of panic attacks
during the follow-up period was predicted by scores on the ASI (Peterson & Reiss, 1987),
In addition, there is evidence that anxious responders to provocation challenges (e.g.,
voluntary hyperventilation; Rapee & Medoro, 1994) are predicted by elevated ASI scores
(Taylor & Cox, 1998). In a one-year prospective study, AS! scores predicted the first
spontaneous panic attack in normal controls as well as in patients with specific phobias
(Ehlers, 1995). Maintenance/relapse was also predicted by ASI scores in panic disorder
patients (Ehlers, 1995). In an investigation of alprazolam discontinuation in panic
disordered patients, only one predictor, baseline-to-post taper change in ASI scores,
predicted the proportion of medication-free patients at 6-month follow-up (Bruce,
Spiegel, Gregg, & Nuzzarello, 1995).
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Challenges to expectancy theOfY!. The development of these hypotheses (Le.,
aILxiety sensitivity is a trait-like characteristic that exists before the development of
pathological anxiety; anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor since the occurrence of panic can
be preceded by elevated anxiety sensitivity; McNally & Lorenz, 1987; Reiss & McNally,
1985; Schmidt et aI., 1998), and their confirmation through the studies listed above has
brought about a challenge to the original expectancy theory. Reiss (1991) stated that not
only can panic attacks be preceded by anxiety sensitivity, but the experience of panic
attacks and the severity of panic symptoms should be connected with high anxiety
sensitivity (Peterson & Reiss, 1987). It was suggested by Reiss (1991) that expectancy
theory could explain panic attacks, even spontaneous (unexpected) attacks, one of the
criteria for panic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Reiss (1991)
proposed that the response of fear is the result of the individual's belief about what will
happen when he or she is faced with a feared object or situation (e.g., I expect to have a
panic attack when I'm in the shopping mall). However, the malmer in which anxiety
sensitivity might trigger unexpected panic attacks is not explained by expectancy theory
(Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).
There is, however, a proposal that uses expectancy theory combined with Clark's
model (1986) to explain panic attacks (Taylor & Fedoroft: 1999). This proposal begins
by stating that anxiety sensitivity is an anxiety amplification factor and is believed to be a
diathesis factor in the etiology of anxiety disorders, especially panic disorder (Reiss,
1991; Reiss & Havercamp, 1996; Reiss & McNally, 1985). The series of actions through
which these sensations could be increased to the level of panic due to the fear of the
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bodily sensations of anxiety are depicted in Clark's model (Clark, 1986). Therefore, it is
possible to combine Clark's cognitive model of panic with expectancy theory (Taylor,
1995a). To describe this further, the catastrophic misinterpretations of the bodily
sensations of anxiety cause panic attacks (i.e., misinterpreting the sensations as signs of
impending death, insanity, or loss of control), according to Clark. There is a lasting
inclination to make such misinterpretations on the part of individuals who possess the
tendency to have panic disorder. These individuals have elevated anxiety sensitivity,
from the viewpoint of Reiss' (1991) theory, because they expect to experience bodily
sensations that are associated with anxiety (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).
This proposed model can explain panic attacks that are triggered by exposure to a
feared object, such as a spider in the case of spider phobia. But how does it explain panic
attacks that seem to come out of the blue? Because expectations of panic do not occur, it
is possible that expectation theory does not explain the subjectively unexpected panic
attacks. However, a response is proposed: the individual's expectancy of anxiety, which
is connected with a feared situation, is triggered by bodily sensations. These are
connected with arousal occurring just prior to the panic attack (Taylor & Fedoroff, 1999).
Also, the view that awareness of benign bodily sensations (e.g., faintness caused by
rapidly changing posture, derealization caused by fatigue or bright fluorescent lights, and
palpitations caused by mild exertion) is the trigger for unexpected panics is based on
Clark's (1986) model. The individual with elevated anxiety sensitivity tends to assume
that these bodily sensations are linked with bodily hann after they are triggered and
discovered. This process begins entry into the vicious cycle of panic (Taylor & Fedoroff,
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1999). On the other hand, these sensations would be considered temporary and
disagreeable, but harmless, by an individual with low anxiety sensitivity (Watt, Stewart,
& Cox, 1998).

_The proposed role ofanxiety sensitivity in the other anxiety disorders:. The
previous section contains information about the currently proposed manner in which the
construct of anxiety sensitivity interacts with Clark's model (1986) and expectancy
theory (Reiss, 1991) in the etiology of panic disorder. This section will discuss the role
that anxiety sensitivity plays in the other anxiety disorders. Although research provides
evidence that anxiety sensitivity is elevated in all anxiety disorders, with the exception of
specific phobias, there is evidence that anxiety sensitivity is found to be most elevated in
panic disorder and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Taylor et al., 1992). With the
readily perceived role which anxiety sensitivity plays in the vicious cycle of panic (Clark,
1986), the discovery that 8IL'l:.iety sensitivity is more elevated in panic disorder compared
with most other anxiety disorders agrees with expectancy theory (Reiss, 1991). However,
ASI scores are almost as high in PTSD as they are in panic disorder (Taylor et at, 1992;
Taylor et aI., 1999), while lower, but elevated, ASI scores are obtained from people with
generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and social phobia (Taylor et

ai., 1992).
The cause for the level of elevation of AS! scores in PTSD may be found by
examining the reason that anxiety sensitivity is elevated in panic disorder. As reported
above, a reciprocal association between anxiety sensitivity and panic was suggested by
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Reiss (1991). Panic attacks may be caused by elevated anxiety sensitivity and anxiety
sensitivity, in tum, may be increased by panic attacks because they are terrifYing
experiences (Taylor et aI., 1999). The sufferer may come to fear the symptoms of anxiety
in general when there are repeated attacks, because anxiety symptoms win be viewed as a
warning that a panic attack might follow (Taylor et aI., 1999). There might possibly be a
similar reciprocal association for some symptoms of PTSD that increases anxiety
sensitivity in the same manner in which panic attacks increase anxiety sensitivity (e.g.,
flashbacks), that is not present in OCD or GAD (Taylor et aI., 1999).
The core criteria ofPTSD are the re-experiencing of thoughts, images, and
memories related to the trauma (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A flashback,
an experience that meets these criteria, appears to have a number of the same qualities
possessed by panic attacks (Jones & Barlow, 1990). For instance, internal or external
stimuli trigger both of these brief, intense experiences (Davidson & Foa, 1991), and both
have many of the same symptoms in common (Burstein, 1985; Jones & Barlow, 1990;
Mellman & Davis, 1985). Seventy-two percent of patients diagnosed with PTSD at one
treatment site experienced flashbacks one or more times per week (MeUman & Davis,
1985). This provides evidence that flashbacks in PTSD may be as common as panic
attacks in panic disorder. It has, in fact, been suggested that flashbacks may be a form of
panic attack (MeUman & Davis, 1985). If panic attacks elevate anxiety sensitivity
because they are rapid ill onset, and are intense and terrifYing experiences, the same
causes in PTSD may elevate anxiety sensitivity (Taylor et aI., 1992). In contrast, the
symptoms which are criteria for OCD and GAD might elevate anxiety sensitivity less
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because they do not have the quality of a sudden outburst or crisis, which is part of panic
attacks and flashbacks (Taylor et aI., 1992). As reported by Taylor et al. (1999), this
proposed explanation has not been explored.
Although the possibility that similar ASI scores for PTSD and panic disorder
might be due in part to the similarity between panic attacks and flashbacks has not been
tested, there is evidence in the Taylor et al. (1992) study that there is a different item
response pattern across the disorders. For individuals who experience panic disorder,
cardio- respiratory fears appear to be most salient, while psychological sensations (e.g.,
"When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy.") are
endorsed more frequently by PTSD patients (Cox et aI., 1999). Through a process of
associative learning (interoceptive conditioning; Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001),
anxiety sensitivity may be inflated by trauma exposure. Anxiety sensitivity may then
amplify PTSD symptoms. For example, the person may become alarmed by reexperiencing symptoms, believing them to be harbingers of insanity (Taylor, 2003).
Whether or not there is a distinct type of anxiety sensitivity which is more significantly
related to PTSD might be determined by a multidimensional measure of anxiety
sensitivity that is better than the ASI at evaluating the fear of cognitive dyscontrol (e.g.,
the ASP). It would be useful to test subjects who have not yet developed PTSD, but have
been exposed to traumatic events, in order to evaluate such a measure's ability to predict
its onset in a prospective study. If successful, such a screen of people who are at risk for
PTSD would identifY individuals who might be helped by early intervention procedures
such as critical incident stress debriefing (Cox et aI., 1999). In addition, regardless of the
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actual relationship between elevated anxiety sensitivity and PTSD, it is suggested that
treatment ofPTSD may be improved by incorporating treatments that reduce anxiety
sensitivity, regardless of whether or not the person has comorbid panic disorder (Taylor,
2003).
In contrast to these studies, there are several other studies in which ASI scores
have been found to be close to Of even higher in social phobia, than those fOf panic
disorder (Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Ball, Otto, Pollack, Uccello, & Rosenbaum, 1995;
Hazen, Walker, & Stein, 1995; Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, & Bystritsky. 1996;
Marks, Lindsay, Marks, & Alkubaisy, 1988). A different pattern of item responding is
also suggested for social phobia, in comparison with that of panic disorder, with
significantly higher scores on three items: (a) "It is important to me not to appear
nervous," (b) "It embarrasses me when my stomach growls," and (c) "Other people
notice when I feel shaky," (Cox et al., 1999).
The fear of negative evaluation, a proposed fundamental expectancy fear, which
is separate from anxiety sensitivity theoretically (e.g., Reiss & McNally, 1985) and
empirically (Taylor, 1993), appears to be assessed by the contents of these three items. It
is also possible that in social phobia, the individuals who experience these symptoms may
fear publicly observable anxiety symptoms (e.g., sweating, blushing, trembling), if they
believe that these symptoms have harmful social consequences (Cox et aI., 1999). Initial
evidence has, in fact, been provided that both of these are separate factors within the ASI
(MCWilliams, Stewart, & MacPherson, 2000). However, the criticism remains that the
ASI Social Concerns subscale is psychometrically weak because it contains so few items

Anxiety Sensitivity: Validity of the ASP

31

(e.g., Stewart et aI., 1997). It is important, therefore, in different clinical situations, to
seek further clarification of the nature of anxiety sensitivity through item-level or
dimensional analyses in order to settle such issues (Cox et aI., 1999) with a measure that
adequately assesses this factor.
Significant contamination by the fear of negative evaluation of some of the
original Asr items is a third possibility, which was empirically supported by the factoranalytic study involving the ASP (Taylor & Cox, 1998). In this study with a non-clinical
sample, the fear of publicly observable symptoms did not have the weight required to be
identified as a factor. It is also possible, that although the fear of negative evaluation
does indeed saturate an expanded or revised measure of anxiety sensitivity, that it is
spread throughout the items and thus is not observable as an obvious separate factor (Cox
et aI., 1999). Taylor and Cox (1998) also argue, as does the current study, that when
there are sufficient items to reliably assess the fear of observable reactions to anxiety with
a clinical sample, the range of scores is sufficient to provide evidence that this fear is an
underlying factor of anxiety sensitivity.
The diagnoses of GAD and OCD are areas that have received less attention in
systematic research (e.g., item level comparisons, factor analysis); however some studies
have provided evidence for elevated ASI scores (Calamari, Wiegartz, Janeck, &
Heffelfinger, 1996; Taylor et a1., 1992; Zeitlin & McNally, 1993). It is possible, but not
known, whether or not unique ASI patterns of responding would also be found for these
disorders. Fear of cognitive dyscontrol, rather than the fear of physical sensations, would
probably be more pertinent (Cox et aI., 1999). Assessment of these clinical groups would
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probably benefit from the addition of more cognitive dyscontrol items, as in the ASP, that
are related to worry and intrusive thoughts and images (e.g., OCD: "It scares me when an
unwanted image pops into my mind" and GAD: "It is tlightening when I can't stop
myself from worrying. "). They would also assist with the prediction of onset,
exacerbation, and relapse for OCD and GAD (Cox et aI., 1999).
Elevation of anxiety sensitivity in specific phobia has not been supported by the
available research (Taylor et aL, 1992; Sandin, Chorot, & McNally, 1996) and it has been
suggested that more relevance may be found in the other fundamental fears (e.g., fear of
injury in blood/injury phobia). Nonetheless, anxiety sensitivity may have relevance for
some types of specific phobias, or specific facets within it (e.g., fear of physical
sensations in choking phobia). Whether or not specific fears and phobias can be
amplified by anxiety sensitivity will have to be determined in future research (Cox et a1.,
1999).

Information-Processing Biases for 111reat

An examination of information-processing biases provides a good follow-up

discussion to the previously mentioned focus on attempts to identify the first-order
factors of the anxiety sensitivity construct. Will individuals who have been identified as
being at risk for panic disorder and other anxiety disorders on measures of anxiety
sensitivity have the same biases as those who currently experience the symptoms ofthese
disorders, including a high level of anxiety sensitivity? That is the main question to be
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answered in the following collections of studies. Relatively stable beliefs about the
negative capacity of certain bodily sensations, which are covered in ASI items, are
assumed to affect online processing of these sensations (McNally, 1999). Anxiety
sensitivity and some of the information-processing biases co-occur with anxiety
disorders. There seems to be an implied link, although a causal link has not yet been
determined.

Interpretive bias. A tendency to interpret ambiguous events as sources of harm is
assumed to be related to pathological anxiety. This factor is expected to increase the
number of anxiety episodes, because it is quite common to experience events whose
meaning is unclear in everyday life (McNally, 1999). There is solid evidence that biases
for interpreting ambiguous information as threatening is a characteristic of people who
have not only panic disorder, but who are also often agoraphobic (Harvey, Richards,
Dziadosz, & Swindell, 1993; Kamieniecki, Wade, & Tsourtos, 1997; McNally & Foa,
1987; Stoler & McNally, 1991; Westling & Ost, 1995;). Elevated anxiety sensitivity has
been obtained uniformly in ASI scores, which were included in most of these studies.
Reduction of anxiety sensitivity, and sometimes a termination of interpretive biases, has
been related to recovery from panic disorder (McNally. 1999). On the other hand,
whether or not the experience of panic attacks caused the interpretive bias, or if it was a
pre-existing risk factor for the development of panic disorder, is not determined by these
studies.
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Attentionai bias. Another assumption is that any bias for selective attention
involving threat wi1l cause anxiety episodes to occur more often due to the fact that
people can pay attention only to a portion of existing stimuli at any given moment
(Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997). Researchers testing this
hypothesis in anxiety disordered patients, inc1uding those with panic disorder, have used
dichotic listening, the Stroop color-naming test, and the dot-,probe attention deployment
paradigm (Asmundson, Sandler, Wilson, & Walker, 1992; Burgess, Jones, Robertson,
Radcliffe, & Emerson, 1981; Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; Hope, Rapee,
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; McNalley, Amir, Louro, Lukach, Riemann, & Calamari,
1994; McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Williams,
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Results of these studies support this hypothesis. Selective
processing of threat cues in most of these attentional tests is a characteristic of panic
disordered individuals. On the other hand, some attempts at replication have failed and
the response to panic concerns has not been consistent (Asmundson et aI., 1992;
McNally, 1999). Perhaps more attention needs to be given to individual differences and
congruence. If threat cues were not congruent with lower-order anxiety sensitivity
factors (i.e., somatic fears, fear of cognitive dyscontrol, fear of anxiety symptoms being
observed) that have been endorsed by the individual, it is likely that no attentlonal bias
would be observed.

Memory bias. Especially while experiencing conditions that cause arousal, people
diagnosed with panic disorder report that thoughts of threat easily come to a level of
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awareness. This suggests that these thoughts of threat may be readily available. It also
implies that infonnation connected to their concerns is more available than other
information and more easily recalled by panic disordered individuals than by people who
do not have the same concems (McNally, 1999). The evidence supports patient reports.
Explicit (i.e., in the person's awareness) memory biases for threat have been shown by
panic disorder patients more than any other anxiety disorder group (Amir, McNally,
Riemann, & Clements, 1996; Beck, Stanley, Averill, Baldwin, & Deagle, 1992; Becker,
Rinck & Margraf, 1994; Cloitre, Shear, Cancienne, & Zeitlin, 1994; Ehlers et al. 1988;
McNally, Foa, & Donnell, 1989; McNally, Otto, Yap, Pollack, & Homig, in press; Otto,
McNalley, Pollack, Chen, & Rosenbaum, 1994; Pauli, Dengler, Wiedemann, Montoya,
Flor, Birbaumer, & Buchkremer, 1997; Rapee, 1994;). Nonetheless, researchers have
begun exploration of other individual difference variables that may interact with the
diagnostic criteria for panic to produce the symptoms, because memory biases for threat
have at times been inconsistent (Otto et aI.; 1994; Rapee, 1994; McNally 1999). Again,
this calls for an examination of the congruence of research variables with the individual's
endorsed lower-order anxiety sensitivity factors.

Interoceptive acuity bias. Ifpanic patients possess the skiJI to detect certain

dreaded bodily sensations better than other people, it is likely that their experience of
panic will be increased. However, evidence supporting the existence of such a skill has
not been consistent (Ehlers, Margraf, Roth, Taylor; & Birbaumer, 1988; Pauli,
Marquardt, Hart, Nutzinger, Holzl, & Strain, 1991); Rapee, 1994). It appears that people
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are not especially good at detecting dreaded bodily sensations just because they fear them
(McNally, 1999). And once again, this calls for attention to congruence ofresearch
variables with the individuaL's endorsed lower-order anxiety sensitivity factors.

Cognitive biases, high anxiety sensitivity, and people at risk for developing panic
attacks. Individuals with panic disorder often obtain higher scores on other measures,
while also scoring higher than other anxiety-disordered people on the ASI (Taylor et a1.,
1992). This factor poses a problem when attempting to develop relationships between
cognitive biases and anxiety sensitivity, In an effort to seek a remedy for this issue,
research has begun with people who are assessed as being at risk for panic disorder due to
elevated ASI scores (McNally, Hornig, Hoffman, & Han,

1997~

Kim, 1992; Sturges &

Goetsch, 1996; Stewart, Conrod, Gignac, & Pihl, 1998), Results thus far show that
although risk for panic attacks and perhaps panic disorder is indicated by high scores on
the ASI, it is not clear whether or not attention or acuity to bodily sensations,
interpretation of their meaning, or ready access to memories about harm that influence
online interpretation are affected by anxiety sensitivity beliefs. It therefore remains for
future research to clarifY further the cognitive biases that are possessed by individuals
with high auxiety sensitivity, who have not yet had panic attacks, as well as detennining
exactly what biases are correlated with the disorder (McNally, 1999).
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Anxiety Sensitivity and Personality

Until recently, little effort has been put into the exploration of the relationship of
the broader personality domain and the anxiety sensitivity construct. This applies
especially to any similarity which might exist between anxiety sensitivity and various
traits (Lilienfeld, 1996), although quite a bit of work has been focused on the differences
between anxiety sensitivity and neuroticism and trait anxiety (e.g., Reiss, 1997). Any
work which has been, or will be completed in this area, will be of value in the areas of the
etiology of anxiety sensitivity and the etiology of anxiety disorders (Lilienfeld, 1999).
The higher order personality dimension of Neuroticism in the three-factor model
of Eysenck (1991), a trait which denotes a pervasive tendency to experience unpleasant
or painful emotional states of all types, is moderately to highly related to the measures of
anxiety sensitivity, according to studies reviewed by Lilienfeld (1999; Arrindell, 1993;
Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996; Saviotti, Grandi, Savron, Ermentini, Bartolucci, Conti, & Fava,
1991). This result is in agreement with the view that amdety sensitivity provides a basis
for anxiety responding due to the fact that Neuroticism is thought to increase
conditionability, which is reflected in the lability of the autonomic nervous system
(Eysenck, 1991). Also, the fact that the measures of anxiety sensitivity have reliable
variance not shared with Neuroticism is supported by studies of the incremental validity
of anxiety sensitivity measures (Lilienfeld, 1997,1999; McNally, 1996). This evidence
supports the view that anxiety sensitivity is a separate construct.
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Little relationship was found (Lilienfeld, 1996) between measures of anxiety
sensitivity, other than the ASI, with the higher order dimension of Constraint, a
fearfulness or behavioral inhibition dimension that is observed in the lower order traits of
avoidance of harm, which measures sensitivity to danger, impulse control, and
traditionalism in Telegen's ( 1978/1982) conceptualization of the

three~ factor

model

(Telegen & Waller, 1994). This dimension is perceived as a tendency to have the
experience of fear in the presence of cues for danger. Although individuals with high
anxiety sensitivity might overreact to cues for danger when it is seen as unpreventable or
unavoidable, these results provide evidence that people with high aILxiety sensitivity
might not be overly afraid of threat which is viewed as being in the future (Lilienfeld,
(999). On the other hand, it could also be stated that anxiety sensitivity appears to be

involved with threat which is viewed as being in the future (e.g., I might suffocate; I
might have a heart attack) as well as with avoidance behaviors. Perhaps the lack of
relationship lies more in the connection of constraint with fear (Le., in the present) and
anxiety sensitivity with anxiety (Le., in the future).
In a more recent study Van der Does et al., (2003) utilized the ASP to identify a
moderately strong correlation of anxiety sensitivity with harm avoidance. This finding
corroborates comparable findings with the ASI, which had been obtained in small
samples and were therefore not statistically significant (Fava.Grandi, Belluardo, Savron,
Ram, Conti, & Saviotti, 1994; Savotti, Grandi, Savron, Ennentini, Bartolucci, Conti, &
Fava, 1991). The fact that the previously reported correlations of hann avoidance with
the ASI and the correlations with the ASP in Van der Does et aL (2003) were of the same
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magnitude provides some indirect support for the position that the ASP is an alternative
measure of anxiety sensitivity (Van der Does et aL, 2003).
Further work is warranted on the relationship between the measures of anxiety
sensitivity and the five-factor model of personality, which inc1udes extraversion and
conscientiousness dimensions and several lower order factors that are related to
interpersonal functioning (Borger, Cox, Fuentes, & Ross, 1996). Interpersonal deficits
(e.g., dependency), which appear to be associated with elevated anxiety sensitivity, may
not only be causes, but also consequences or complications that are a result of elevated
anxiety sensitivity (e.g., panic attacks, limited symptom attacks), Another possibility is
that the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and interpersonal deficits is mediated by
Neuroticism. Because Neuroticism is pervasive in its effect on self-concept and
emotional adjustment (Watson & Clark, 1984), researchers need to take this factor under
consideration when examining connections between anxiety sensitivity measures and
interpersonal functioning (Lilienfeld, 1999),
A significant correlation has been found between anxiety sensitivity and
Absorption, a tendency to become engrossed in sensory experiences, and thus possibly at
risk for anxiety disorders (e.g., panic disorder) through hypersensitivity to interoceptive
cues (Lilienfeld, 1996; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), Longitudinal studies should be used
to investigate this possibility as weB as the potential for a mediating role by Neuroticism
in the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and Absorption, which is indicated by the
moderate overlap between Absorption and Neuroticism (Lilienfeld, 1999; Tellegen,
197811982 ).
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The data reviewed here (Lilienfeld, 1999) cannot provide information about the
direction of the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and personality traits due to the
fact that it is correlational (Lilienfeld, 1999). While the trait perspective (Cattell, 1950)
supports the hypothesis that anxiety sensitivity and other lower order traits develop
through the interaction of general higher order traits like Neuroticism with learning
experiences, information, and other personality traits, it is also possible that the
relationship goes in the opposite direction (Reiss, 1997). For example, anxiety sensitivity
might cause Neuroticism and other higher order dimensions (Reiss, 1991; Reiss and
Havercamp, 1996). New perspectives about the etiology of panic and the other anxiety
disorders might be gained through efforts made to comprehend these progressions
(Lilienfeld, 1999).

Developmental trajectOlY ofanxiety sensitivity. No discussion about the etiology

of anxiety sensitivity would be complete without discussing its development in children.
It is also important, when examining the etiology of the fear of anxiety in children, to
look at the work that has been completed regarding anxiety sensitivity and developmental
issues. Currently, there are few existing studies that explore anxiety sensitivity in
children. Fortunately, correction of this oversight has begun with a focus on whether or
not a connection between anxiety sensitivity and negative emotional responses to stressevoking tasks will be found with children, as is the case with adults (Silverman &
Weems, 1999). For example, a measure was built of items concerning the fear of
physical symptoms for the exploration of children's reactions to exposure to internal and
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external stimuli (Unnewehr, Schneider, Margraf, Jenkins, & Forin, 1996). Results
provided evidence that compared children having low levels of fear of the physical
symptoms of anxiety, children with at least moderate levels of fear reported higher levels
of anxiety in reaction to the hyperventilation task. On the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
for Children (STAIC), their scores were significantly higher immediately following
completion of the task. They were also less likely to finish the task (Unnewehr et aI.,
1996). These findings suggest the inherent possibility that the construct of anxiety
sensitivity is a predictor of the fear of anxiety in children. Elevated anxiety sensitivity
may predispose children, as it does adults, to react in a negative manner to anxiety
sensations (Unnewehr et at, 1996), This would also support the possibility that anxiety
sensitivity exists, if not prior to, at least at the same time as the personality constructs
discussed above.

AnXiety sensitivity and children: brain physiology and future areas of
investigation. Recent work in developmental theory and the growing wealth of
information regarding brain physiology win make it possible to enter new and exciting
areas of investigation of the etiology of anxiety sensitivity. For instance it has been
established that there is a greater likelihood of a higher level of physiological reactions
connected to a lower threshold of reactivity in the amygdala and hypothalamus in
children with a higher than nonnallevel of behavioral inhibition (e.g., Kagan, Reznick,
Gibbons, 1989; Kagan, Reznick, Snidman, 1987, 1988). Could this also develop into
elevated anxiety sensitivity that is related to a lower than normal psychological tolerance
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of their reactivity (Silverman & Weems, 1999)1 In a similar examination of attachment
theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1973), children may be vulnerable to anxiety and other problems
when they are insecurely attached (Manassis & Bradley, 1994). It is conceivable that the
experience of anxiety symptoms is effected by the insecure nature of these children's
cognitive response styles and is played out in the form of elevated anxiety sensitivity
(Silverman & Weems, 1999).

Heritable Cornponents qlAnxiety Sensitivity and Panic Disorder

Apparently there is a solidly heritable element in panic disorder, which has been
supported decisively in twin studies (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1993;
Perna, Caldirola, Aranncio & Bellodi, 1997; Skre, Onstad, Torgersen, Lygren, &
Kringlen, 1993; Torgersen, 1983), Anxiety experienced in response to carbon dioxide
inhalation is a tendency that runs in families (Perna, Bertani, Caldirola, & Bellodi, 1996;
Perna, Cocci, Bertani, Arancio, & Bellodi, 1995). This supports the view that a
modification in brainstem sensitivity to carbon dioxide, a hard-wired biological
abnonnality, is an inherited element in panic disorder. This view would label anxiety
sensitivity as a physiological risk factor. On the other hand, the tendency to believe that
the bodily sensations related to this challenge are physically threatening or dangerous
(i.e., anxiety sensitivity) might be the factor that is inherited (Stein & Rapee, 1999).
As mentioned earlier, the relationship of anxiety sensitivity as a subcomponent of
neuroticism or negative affectivity, the higher order factor, has been well-documented in
research using measures of anxiety sensitivity (Lilienfeld, 1996; Rapee & Medoro, 1994),
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addition, a general tendency toward emotionality, sometimes referred to as the general

neurotic syndrome (Andrews, 1996), has been well-documented as being inherited in
anxiety disorders. The notion that a large part of the variance in anxiety sensitivity is
probably genetically detennined is therefore a logical assumption (Stein & Rapee, 1999).
It is likely that anxiety sensitivity, also a subcomponent of trait anxiety (Lilienfeld, 1996),

is mediated by the same factors (Le., genetic vulnerability, family factors, socialization
experiences, and specific life events) that are being investigated regarding the origins of
anxiety disorders (Hudson & Rapee, in press; Rapee; 1997). Possibly the element of
anxiety sensitivity, which is linked to experience, is the trigger that decides which
individuals who have inherited the disorder will actually experience the symptoms. The
inheritable portion of anxiety sensitivity is the biological guide which is required for the
development of panic disorder. This theoretical conceptualization could provide a
framework for both biology and psychology in the etiology of panic disorder (Stein &
Rapee, 1999).

Environmental Contributions to Elevated Anxiety Sensitivity

This is a fascinating area for current and future exploration. What triggers the
onset of anxiety sensitivity, if it is established to be genetically based? In addition to
preventive treatment interventions for the individual, will environmental factors be
identified which can also be addressed as part of treatment? The following studies
illustrate further the importance of thorough and accurate measures of the anxiety
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sensitivity construct which have been developed through a thorough understanding of the
underlying domains. Better measures will provide a more accurate presentaHon of the
individual's beliefs which can be investigated for prevention and intervention.

Parental reinforcement. A sample of

1 university students participated in the

extension of an earlier study on childhood learning experiences and panic attacks (Ehlers,
1993). The ASI was used for the assessment of anxiety sensitivity levels and the Panic
Attack Questionnaire-Revised served as the measure for the assessment of panic history.
The learning experiences of high- anxiety sensitivity students were found to be related to
parental reinforcement of sick-role behavior involving somatic symptoms in general.
Also, high -anxiety sensitivity students had received more special attention and/or
directions from parents to take special care of themselves. This was in contrast to the
expectation that the learning experiences of high- anxiety sensitivity students would be
specific to anxiety symptoms (Watt et aL, 1998). The notion that elevated levels of
anxiety sensitivity may be the result of learning to catastrophize about bodily symptoms
in general, not anxiety-related symptoms specifically, is suggested by this outcome (Watt
et ai., 1998). On the other hand, those who reported the experience of panic attacks
reported more often that their learning experiences involved modeling and parental
reinforcement that was specifically related to anxiety-related symptoms (Watt et aI.,
1998).
In results that are consistent with these and other retrospective studies (e.g., Watt
& Stewart, 2000), initial empirical support for a partial mediation effect of anxiety
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sensitivity in the relationship between childhood learning and panic attacks in young
adults has been provided (Stewart, Taylor, Jang, Cox, Watt, Fedoroff, & Borger, 2001).
In the assessment of the learning experiences of 478 university students, structural
equation modeling was used to find that: (1) learning history for arousal-reactive somatic
symptoms (e.g., nausea, racing heart, shortness of breath, and dizziness) directly
influenced both anxiety sensitivity levels and panic frequency, (2) anxiety sensitivity
directly influenced panic frequency, and (3) learning history for arousal-non-reactive
symptoms (e.g., colds, aches and pains, and rashes) directly influenced anxiety
sensitivity, but did not directly influence panic frequency. This last finding lends further
support to the concept that the source of elevated anxiety sensitivity may be found in
learning to catastrophize about somatic symptoms in general rather than about anxietyrelated symptoms in particular (Watt & Stewart, 2000; Watt et at, 1998).

Parental uncontrolled behavior. An additional finding is the prediction of ASl
scores through the frequency of exposure to parental uncontrolled behavior due to
drunkenness andlor anger, as well as the report by individuals with elevated anxiety
sensitivity of significantly more episodes of exposure (Watt et aI., 1998). Initial evidence
has also been provided that anxiety sensitivity levels in young adulthood were related to
retrospectively reported childhood exposure to parental problem-drinking behaviors
(MacPherson, Stewart, & McWilliams, 2001). This finding adds to the growing literature
suggesting that acquired anxiety sensitivity may playa modest mediating role in
explaining relationships between childhood learning experiences and anxiety-related
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symptoms in adulthood (e.g., MacPherson et aI., 2001; Stewart et aI., 2001; Watt &
Stewart, 2000~). In future research anxiety sensitivity levels and family history of alcohol
use should be explored due to the fact that there is evidence for a connection between
elevated anxiety sensitivity and alcohol use in young adults (Stewart, 1996). It is also
possible that parental alcohol use was linked with the parental experience of anxiety
symptoms and anxiety sensitivity. This has not been explored (MacPherson et aI., 2001).

Chronic illness. And finally, in Watt et al. (1998), no difference was found
between the panic groups and the anxiety sensitivity groups relative to the number of
household members with chronic illness. Neither did this factor contribute significantly
to the prediction of ASI scores. Given that previous findings indicate that chronically ill
family members and the development of anxiety do have a positive relationship (Bianchi,
1971; Ehlers, 1993), this factor should be explored further in future research as to the
cause of the difference (Watt et a1.. 1998).

Learning vs genetics. In Watt et a1. (1998) only 11-12% of the variance in ASI
scores was accounted for by learning experiences, which suggests that anxiety sensitivity
is largely innate. On the other hand, both the genetic and environmental contributions to
anxiety sensitivity were the focus in a twin study (Stein, lang, and Livesley, 1999). In
this study it was found that 45% ofthe variance in anxiety sensitivity levels was
accounted for by a genetic component and over half of the variance in anxiety sensitivity
levels was the result of environmental factors. Certain fears in children can be predicted
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at set ages such as separation anxiety in early childhood and fears of social evaluation in
adolescence (Ollendick & King, 1991). A predictable onset for anxiety sensitivity would
strongly support a genetic basis and future research could compare scores on measures of
anxiety sensitivity of parents and children or twin pairs (Lilienfeld et aI., 1996; Plomin,
1990; Watt et aI., 1998).
Future research could also include an interview with high, medium and low
anxiety sensitivity subjects, which could support the generation of hypotheses regarding
issues in development such as: (a) various types oflearning experiences (e.g.,
interoceptive conditioning, death of a significant other, trauma exposure),
(b) predisposing personality factors (e.g., trait anxiety; Lilienfeld et at, 1996),
(c) repeated benign exposures to

anxiety~related

bodily symptoms which might

'inoculate' a child against the development of anxiety sensitivity (i.e., 'latent inhibition'),
(d) a possible synergistic interaction of learning history factors, rather than a simple
additive process, in the development of anxiety sensitivity (e.g., Ollendick & King,
1991), and (e) maintenance supported by habituation to anxiety~related sensations
through repeated, non-traumatic exposure (Menzies & Clarke, 1995; Watt et aI., 1998).
Finally, the future exploration of more specific direct and indirect routes of learning, such
as the separate influences of positive and negative reinforcement vs. punishment, would
be valuable contributions to the study of the etiology of anxiety sensitivity. A child's
anxiety-related behaviors and complaints might be decreased by parental punishment, but
it may also increase his or her anxiety due to learned concerns about the consequences of
exhibiting anxiety symptoms (Stewart et aI., 1997).
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Prospective Evaluations f?f Anxiety Sensitivity

This type of investigation is quite valuable for the identification of the risk factors
for anxiety sensitivity and for the maintenance of pathology over time, as well as for
treatment maintenance and relapse. It also provides information regarding the level of
anxiety sensitivity involvement and the involvement of other factors in the development
of anxiety pathology. The four published longitudinal studies which have evaluated the
role of anxiety sensitivity in the onset of anxiety symptoms in a noncHnical sample
(Ehlers, 1995; Harrington, Schmidt, & Teich, 1996; Maller & Reiss,

1992~

Schmidt et a1.,

1997) have provided consistent support for anxiety sensitivity as a risk factor for anxiety
pathology and in particular for panic attacks. There is also evidence that anxiety
sensitivity is a maintenance factor. This is stated in the two published longitudinal studies
which evaluated subjects with clinical or sub clinical anxiety symptoms (Bruce et a1.,
1995; Ehlers, 1995).
With the exception of the previously mentioned Schmidt et a1. (1997) study
involving more than 1,000 US Air Force Academy cadets, the low base rates for anxiety
disorders in the general population, which according to the Epidemiological Catchment
Area Study (Eaton & Keyl, 1990; Keyl & Eaton, 1990) are 2% for panic disorder, has
meant that the studies are lacking in the power which is needed to detect low base rate
phenomena (Schmidt, 1999). All of the other studies combined have only 15 cases that
presented new panic attacks. Nonetheless, while noting the low rate of panic attacks, it is
important to also note that a relationship between anxiety sensitivity and panic was found
in the majority of these studies and a considerable number of first panic attacks were
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predicted by elevated anxiety sensitivity in the US Air Force Academy study (Schmidt,
1999).
On the other hand, these studies do not fully verifY a relationship between anxiety
sensitivity and the onset of anxiety at the clinical level. For example, it is difficult to
decide whether or not high anxiety sensitivity existed prior to the development of anxiety
disorders in the Maller and Reiss study (1992). Although they view this study as
providing evidence for a solid relationship between anxiety sensitivity and anxiety
disorders, there was no diagnostic evaluation at the start of the study (Schmidt, 1999).
The Harrington et at (1996) study did not find a relationship, but there was assessment
for psychiatric history (Schmidt, 1999).
The Air Force data probably provides the best evidence that high anxiety
sensitivity plays a part in the sequence of change that leads to anxiety syndromes. During
five weeks of intense basic training a small number of cadets reported the experience of
symptoms at clinical level, including multiple panic attacks, panic-related worry, high
levels of anxiety symptoms, and anxiety-related impainnent (Schmidt, 1999; Schmidt et

aL. 1997). During this period, in which individuals who were susceptible to anxiety
symptoms were assessed while experiencing high levels of stress, ample evidence was
provided for the diathesis-stress model (Schmidt, 1999).
Other variables are involved in the origin and development of panic. Gender, age,
negative life events, and medical conditions are factors that make contributions to the
development of anxiety, according to longitudinal epidemiological reports (Breslau &
Davis, 1993; Keyl & Eaton, 1990; Eaton & Keyl, 1990; Schmidt & TeIcb, 1997).
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Cognitive factors such as predictability, perceived control, and perceived safety, have
been implicated in other studies due to their effect on the level of anxious responding in
both clinical (Carter, Hollon, Carson, & Shelton, 1995; Rapee, Mattick, & Murrell, 1986;
Sanderson, Rapee, & Barlow, 1989) and nonclinical popUlations (Schmidt,

1999~

Schmidt & Lerew, 2002; Schmidt & Teich, 1994; TeIch, Silvennan, & Schmidt, 1996),
Because there is now evidence that anxiety sensitivity is involved in the origin
and development of panic, there is also evidence that anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor,
and not simply a byproduct of panic development The next step is the use of cognitive
behavioral therapy as a primary prevention intervention, since it has been shown to
reduce anxiety sensitivity significantly (Bruce et a1., 1995; Schmidt & Teich, 1997),
Such an intervention can be used to act in advance, preventing anxiety and panic
reactions in people who are at risk (Schmidt, 1999). The goals for prevention, treatment,
and relapse prevention of the symptoms of anxiety, including an understanding of how
the mechanics of anxiety sensitivity fit into the attainment of these goals, will be
discussed in the next section. This understanding is necessary in order to ensure that all
possible benefits to be obtained from this study will be utilized.
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Possible Benefits to Be Derived/rom Promotion of the Understanding of the Mechanics
ofAnxiety Sensitivity for Prevention, Treatment, and Relapse Prevention ofthe Symptoms
ofAnxiety

This section provides an overview of the work that is focused on anxiety disorders
and anxiety sensitivity. The current status of assessment, treatment, treatment
maintenance, and research are briefly reviewed. Also reviewed are the gains to be made
by current and future efforts in understanding the mechanics of anxiety sensitivity, its
practical applications in these areas, as well as its prevention. It has been reported that
anxiety disorders incur the largest direct and indirect cost to the national economy of all
psychological disorders in the United States, totaling $46.6 billion, or 31.5% of the total
cost of $147.8 billion for all psychological disorders in 1990. Particularly high were
indirect economic costs such as productivity. Anxiety disorders claimed $35.4 billion, or
47.3% of the total of $74.9 billion for all indirect costs caused by mental illnesses
(Dupont, 1993). If the etiology of anxiety sensitivity can be understood, the provision of
interventions that wi]] prevent the development of anxiety disorders can begin.

Prevention issues. In recent years significant growth has occurred in the
treatment efficacy of anxiety disorders. Eighty percent of patients have been reported to
be free of panic symptoms at the completion of treatment in clinics that specialize in
anxiety disorder treatment in Europe and North America. This success has been
maintained at follow-up evaluations of up to 2 years (Margraf, Barlow, Clark, & TeIch,
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1993). However, there is only limited research in progress, in which the purpose is the
identification and control of onset factors, although prevention has often been part of the
discussion of anxiety disorders (Norton, Asmundson, Cox, & Norton, 2000). Until most
anxiety disorders are prevented, and the rest are effectively treated, the struggle will not
have been completed. The most significant areas for research will be growth in
understanding all of the anxiety disorders through clarification of the mechanisms which
bring about the appearance of anxiety responses and anxiety disorders in individuals
affected by them; this, of course, will include the protective factors which keep others
who are exposed to the same experiences or enviromnents from developing them
(Heimberg, 2000).
New conceptual models of anxiety, depression, and related states, which are
appearing with the use of sophisticated modeling techniques, far exceed the present
perceptions of anxiety and depression. These new models ignore the present systems of
categorization and bring about a much more accurate identification and understanding of
the basic traits that cause the individual to be vulnerable to the development of these
disorders (Barlow, 2000). From this basic research, a new group of interventions aimed
more directly at underlying vulnerabilities and emphasizing the prevention of emotional
disorders will be developed. The identification of children at risk for anxiety disorders is
likely to be the first action. Following this, researchers will seek to understand more
clearly the psychosocial factors that result in the onset of specific disorders, to rate the
results of preventive interventions, and to perform projective studies of these children,
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which are based on new but strong findings on the chronicity of anxiety disorders
(Barlow, 2000).
Recent research on behavioral inhibition (e.g., Kagan et at, 1989), attachment
(e.g., Manassis and Bradley, 1994), family processes (Dadds, Barrett, Rapee, & Ryan,
1996), cognitive-behavioral treatments (e.g., Kendall, 1994; Silverman & Kurtines, 1996)
and prevention programs (Dadds, Spence, Holland, Barrett, & Laurens, 1997) provides
evidence that researchers have recently turned their attention toward anxiety in children.
Their goals have been the development of an understanding of the etiology and
maintenance, as well as the provision of prevention and treatment of anxiety disorders in
this segment of the population (Silverman & Weems, 1999). Turning their attention not
only toward anxiety sensitivity as a construct alone, but also as it is related to these areas
of study, will bring about a greater increase in knowledge in these areas (Silverman &
Weems, (999). In fact, it has been discovered in a growing body of evidence that there
of seems not only to be a number of similarities, but also a number differences in anxiety
as it appears in children and adults (Silverman, 1993). Elevated anxiety sensitivity, as
well as a great deal of what is apparent in anxious adults is also seen in anxious children.
Possibly there are other similarities (e.g., anxiety sensitivity as a predictor of anxiety and
panic disorder in youth) that wil1 be of use, for example, in designing prevention
programs (Silverman & Weems, 1999). Primary prevention would be greatly enhanced if
it were found that high anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor for anxiety disorders. After
screening children or adolescents, (e.g., in school settings) to find those with elevated
anxiety sensitivity, anxiety sensitivity could be lowered by methods used in cognitive-
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behavior therapy for panic disorder, which is designed specifical1y to treat the fear of the
bodily sensations of anxiety. In theory, the risk for anxiety disorders, and possibly other
disorders, would be decreased (Taylor, Rabian, & Fedoroff, 1999).
Findings very much like those found with the ASI have been found in recent
studies using the Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index, an instrument which has strong
initial support for reliability and validity (CASI; Silverman, Fleisig, Rabian, & Peterson,
1991). These findings have supported differential diagnosis and panic prediction,
including children's internal catastrophic attributions. They have also supported the
appearance of a relationship between anxiety sensitivity, depression, and other negative
cognitive states such as worry (Silverman & Weems, ] 999). At the time of their report in
Taylor (1999), Silverman & Weems wrote that these results had not been put into a useful
theoretical framework. Replication and extension are also needed, due to the significance
that these findings have for the prevention of anxiety disorders (Silvennan & Weems,
1999).
In progress at the time of their report in Taylor (] 999) was a study (Silverman &
Weems, 1999) involving a foHow-up on 273 children who completed the CASI in 1991.
These children were being tracked when they were adolescents, 8 years after the initial
assessment for the prediction of panic and other anxiety disorders. One of the next steps
will be the design of prevention intervention programs jfthese results show that elevated
CASI scores in children are indicators of a likely history of panic attacks. This is in
contrast to children without elevated CASI scores who are not likely to have such a
history (Silverman & Kurtines, 1996). Of course, without the means to provide accurate
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assessment of those who are at risk for the development of anxiety disorders due to
anxiety sensitivity, many individuals will not be identified and preventive interventions
will not be provided.

Research and assessment issues. The perception of the causes of anxiety disorders

needs to change so that accuracy of assessment and research is improved. In this section
are proposals by several investigators suggesting that it is time to put unidimensional
concepts aside and to adopt multidimensional concepts and measures for use in research
and assessment. Panic disorder, which is related to the most elevated level of anxiety
sensitivity, has received the most attention, as can be seen in the following material.
Much research has based design and assessment strategies on a unidimensional
perception of panic (i.e., rather than a heterogeneous condition with identifiable subtypes,
panic has been viewed as a single, unitary phenomenon). General improvement in results
and increased predictive power could be brought about by the use of a multidimensional
perspective that includes congruence (Cox, 1996). As an example in the area of research,
the findings on memory bias in panic disorder continue to be inconsistent (Cox, 1996;
Rapee, 1994).
A possible cause stems from basing research on a unidimensional perception
rather than using a multidimensional perspective and identifying the lower-order factor
for anxiety sensitivity that matches the individual's fears. Some panic disorder patients
may connect words such as coronary and stroke with danger, producing a very strong
effect. For a sample of patients more focused on dizziness or depersonalization, these
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words would have little effect due to the lack of congruence. Studies could be improved
by identifYing trait subtypes and matching the stimulus (situation) with the trait (i.e.,
congruence), when performing panic provocation studies. Initial support has been
obtained for this congruent interaction (Leliot & Bass, 1990). The prediction of an
improvement in accuracy in panic disorder research can be tested if a multidimensional
measure of anxiety sensitivity (e.g., ASP) that is psychometrically solid can be developed
(e.g., when there is improved accuracy in matching the symptoms caused by a
provocation task and the symptoms a person fears, precision in predicting panic attacks
will improve; Cox, 1996; Cox et aI., 1999).
Our comprehension of the reasons that certain bodily sensations trigger panic
attacks in certain individuals will be increased by continued study of the anxiety
sensitivity dimensions. Results of a recent study agree with this proposal (Cox et aI.,
1999). The fear of dyspnea (i.e., an aspect of anxiety sensitivity which means difficulty
in breathing) caused an anxious response to a congruent trigger (i.e., carbon dioxide
challenge), in a college student sample. This aspect of anxiety sensitivity was a better
predictor of panic attacks than the ASI total score (McNally & Eke, 1996). In other
research, it appears that ASI items that evaluate the individual's beliefs about the
catastrophic consequences of certain bodily sensations are more pertinent to the
evaluation of panic disorder (Cox et aI., 1999).
Finally, in assessment there are clinical implications for the hierarchical model of
anxiety sensitivity, which suggests viewing the patient's anxiety sensitivity profile on aU
of the first-order anxiety sensitivity factors (i.e., physical, social, and cognitive concerns;

Anxiety Sensitivity: Validity of the ASP
Taylor et al.,

1996~

57

Zinbarg et al., 1997), For instance, there is evidence that patients

who have social phobia as their principal diagnosis would tend to have a higher Anxiety
Sensitivity~Social

Concerns score than an Anxiety Sensitivity-Physical Concerns score

on the AS!. (Zinbarg et aL,1997). Those who have a higher Anxiety Sensitivity-Physical
Concerns score will probably have panic disorder as their first diagnosis (Taylor, 1996).
Therefore, a more detailed evaluation and more confidence in a patient's principal
diagnosis can be gained by checking the degree of match between his or her anxiety
sensitivity profile, than by using only the total anxiety sensitivity score. Also, there is the
possibility that themes in patients' concerns other than those related to their diagnoses
can be identified with the use of such profiles (Zinbarg et aL,

1997~

Zinbarg & Schmidt;

2002). Such accuracy in assessment issues will lead to improved treatment interventions.

Treatment intervention research: children. Use ofthe CASI in treatment trials is a
possibility, as is its potential use in prevention trials. The principal ways in which it
could be used are as (a) an outcome variable, (b) a variable to prescribe specific treatment
procedures, and (c) a predictor of treatment response. Recent research, which uses the
CASI in each of these ways, has been promising (Silvennan & Weems, t 999). In a
multiple baseline study of cognitive-behavioral therapy for panic disorder with
agoraphobia, the CASI was used as an outcome variable. Four adolescents, ages 13, 14,
16, and 17, were the subjects. It was found that the CAS I is an accurate test for
treatment-related change (Ollendick, 1995),
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Some psychotherapy researchers are starting to see the significance of matching
or prescribing treatment interventions to individual characteristics of patients, while they
are aware that randomization of treatments across subjects is an excellent experimental
method used to assess treatment efficacy (e.g., Beutler, 1991; Kazdin, 1993; Kearney &
Silverman, ]990; Ost, Johansson, & Jerremalm, 1982). With the use of this alternative
method; children with elevated anxiety sensitivity could be identified through scores on
the CASI, perhaps in relationship with other measures. Prescriptive treatment could be
given to these children, in which an intervention is assigned that targets anxiety
sensitivity reduction in accordance with their scores. (Silverman & Weems, 1999). The
use ofthe CASI in this way is supported by the results oftwo single case studies (Eisen
& Silverman, 1993, 1998). These studies did not focus on anxiety sensitivity, but

focused on certain types of response to anxiety. The children who were chosen for the
prescribed treatment, which matched their symptom patterns of anxiety, experienced a
better outcome. Three of the four subjects fell within normal limits and maintained this
improvement at 6-month foHow-up. None of the subjects who received nonprescriptive
treatment experienced enough change to reduce scores to nonnallimits (Eisen &
Silverman, 1998). The same multiple baseline design could be used for testing the
usefulness of prescribing anxiety sensitivity reduction for children who experience
elevated anxiety sensitivity (Silverman & Weems, 1999).
It is time now that researchers turn their attention to the identification of factors

that predict the success or failure of treatment, as support mounts for the efficacy of
treatments for children with anxiety disorders (e.g., Kendall, 1994). One of these factors
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might be elevated anxiety sensitivity. If research findings support this, in addition to
giving the child the basic treatment package, it would suggest that anxiety sensitivity
reduction be targeted also (Silverman & Weems, 1999). The possibility that the CASI can
be used as a predictor and possible moderator of treatment success or failure has been
explored in an introductory manner. Fifty-four children, ages 6-17, diagnosed with social
phobia, overanxious disorder, or GAD were given exposure-based cognitive-behavioral
group therapy in a controlled clinical triaL The results showed that children who tended
to have elevated anxiety sensitivity prior to treatment did not improve, (i.e., still met
DSM criteria for their presenting problem), compared with children who improved with
treatment (i.e., no longer met diagnostic criteria; Silvennan & Weems, 1999).

Treatment intervention research: adults. It has been suggested that focusing on a
deeper understanding of the basic processes causing the anxiety disorders will support the
most rapid growth in treatment, while it is also important to maintain the positive
movement being made over the last decade in the direct study of treatment interventions.
Among suggested areas that need attention are: (a) too many individuals do not respond
or do not respond completely to treatments for which there is significant evidence of
effectiveness and (b) too little is known about the predictors of treatment outcome
(Heimberg, 2000).
At this time, new treatments have not directly resulted from the anxiety sensitivity
interpretation of the fear of anxiety. However, there has been progress made in the
prediction of treatment outcome. The ASI, the most widely used measure of anxiety
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sensitivity, has been increasingly used as an outcome variable in treatment research on
panic disorder (e.g., Telch et aI., 1994), and it successfully predicts outcome (Clark,
Salkovskis, Hackmann, Middleton, Anastasiades, & Gelder, 1994). For example, the
only significant predictor of stable withdrawal from alprazolam among panic disorder
patients was found to be the ASI in a study conducted by Bruce et al. (1995).
Scores on the ASI appear to be correlated with improvement following treatment.
This is indicated by consistent results across studies that show reductions in scores
following short-term therapist-directed cognitive-behavioral treatment for panic disorder
(Otto and Reilly-Harrington, 1999). ASI scores for 160 treated subjects from seven
studies showed a weighted average drop in scores of 14 points (Gould, Otto, and Pollack,
1995; Hazen, Walker, & Eldridge, 1996; Hegel, Ravaris, & Ahles, 1994; McNally &
Lorenz, 1987; Penava, Otto, Maki, & Pollack (in press); Shear, Pilkonis, Cloitre, & Leon,
1994; TeIch, Lucas, Schmidt, Hanna, Jaimez, & Lucas, 1993). In two longitudinal
studies, remission during follow-up of panic attacks, panic-related anxiety, and phobic
avoidance was predicted by a reduction of anxiety sensitivity to nonclinical range for
anxiety-disordered individuals who received a complete cognitive-behavioral treatment
protocol (Schmidt et aI., 1997) and panic-free withdrawal ofbenzodiazepines (Bruce et
aI., 1995).
These results have given rise to speculation about the variables that may be linked
to score reduction. In a few studies it does not appear to matter what treatment mode is
used, or whether or not it focuses on fears of anxiety sensations, as does cognitivebehavioral treatment, which consists of cognitive restructuring and exposure
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interventions. When treatment is effective it appears to cause a reduction in ASI scores
(Otto, Pollack, Sachs, & Rosenbaum 1991; Clark et 81., 1994; Otto & Reilly-Harrington,
1999). Possibly the reduction of anxiety sensitivity through treatment is accomplished
through a means which is not connected to the origin ofthese fears (Otto &

Reilly~

Harrington, 1999). Perhaps there is the need to consider other possible mediating
variables such as the development of the individual's belief that he or she has sense of
control over outcome. There is some evidence that perceived control interacts with
anxiety sensitivity to predict panic, and there is also evidence that perceived
predictability interacts with anxiety sensitivity to predict anxiety (Schmidt & Lerew,
2002).

It is also possible that certain dimensions of anxiety sensitivity may be reduced by
specific exposure exercises. General CBT procedures for panic disorder may be the most
efficient means oftreatment for those individuals with generally elevated anxiety
sensitivity (i.e., elevated scores on multiple dimensions of anxiety sensitivity). Treatment
that is matched to the symptoms of the individual may be best for others. This type of
treatment involves the use of certain procedures to reduce elevations on specific
dimensions of anxiety sensitivity (e.g., relying mainly on methods that induce cognitive
anxiety symptoms in people who only have an extreme fear of cognitive dyscontrol;
Taylor, Rabian, & Fedoroff, 1999).
There are also significant connections between relapse prevention and anxiety
sensitivity theory and research. As effective as cognitive behavioral therapy and
phannacotherapy are in treating panic disorder, sometimes those who respond to
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treatment relapse. Given the rate of success for measures of the fear of anxiety sensations
in predicting long-tenn effectiveness of treatment, an important and necessary tinal stage
appears to be the focus of attention on elevated scores in individuals who have finished
acute treatment (e.g. Clark et aL~ 1994; Ehlers, 1995; Pollack, Otto, Sabatino, Majcher,
Worthington, McArdele, and Rosenbaum, 1996; Otto & Reilly-Harrington, 1999).
Assessment for anxiety sensitivity level at the end oftreatment, with the provision of
anxiety sensitivity-focused additional treatment for people with elevated anxiety
sensitivity. has been suggested in these cases (Taylor, Rabian, & Fedoroff, 1999). Focus
on anxiety sensitivity as a risk factor for panic disorder development also appears to be
worthwhile. One study in which anxiety sensitivity was reduced in a nonclinical sample
with a brief (three-session) cognitive-behavioral technique (Harrington, TeIch,
Abplanalp, & Hamilton, 1995) has provided the first evidence of effectiveness in this
area (Otto &

Reilly~Harrington,

1999).

EffOIts to make comparisons between the effects of psychosocial treatment and
phannacotherapy on anxiety sensitivity have not been easy due to the fact that the ASl as
a measure is not usually pad of the studies which have evaluated the efficacy of
phannacotherapy in the treatment of panic disorder. Nonetheless, while there appear to
be significant reductions in anxiety sensitivity with medications alone, patients with
remaining symptoms of anxiety continue to have elevated ASI scores (Otto

Reilly-

Harrington, 1999). There is evidence to support the use of cognitive behavioral therapy
as an effective technique to reduce further the elevated ASI scores in these patients, and
aid medication discontinuation (e.g., Bmce et ai., 1995; Hegel et aI., 1994).
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Related Research

The following section, while not inclusive, supports an understanding of the
current status of research related to anxiety sensitivity. This includes development of an
evolving conceptualization made possible by new and increasingly sophisticated research
designs and statistical methods. Presented here is representative evidence for the
dimensionality, hierarchical structure, and symptom specificity of anxiety sensitivity and
its current measures.

Anxiety Sensitivity and DepreSSion: Symptom Specificity and the Tripartite Model

It is of interest to discuss and understand the current status of the theoretical

conceptualization and related research regarding anxiety and depression, and specifically
anxiety sensitivity as a construct While a number of existing studies provide evidence
that anxiety sensitivity is a risk factor for anxiety, a relationship for anxiety sensitivity
with depression has also been found (Otto, Pollack, Fava, Uccello, & Rosenbaum, 1995;
Taylor, Koch, Woody, & McLean, 1996; Van der Does et aI., 2003). Patients with
comorbid major depression and panic disorder have been found to have higher ASI
scores (M = 40.3, SD

11.3) than panic disorder patients without depression (M = 31.4,

SD = 9.6; Taylor et aI., 1996). There is also increasing support for anxiety sensitivity, or
some factor of atL"{iety sensitivity such as phrenophobia (Le., the fear of the loss of
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cognitive control), as a risk factor for depression (Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997;
Zinbarg, Brown, Barlow, & Rapee, 2001).
Whether or not a variable is a vulnerability factor can be decided, as much as
possible, by three criteria which have been provided for non-experimental
psychopathology research (Garber & Hollon, 1991): (a) covariance should exist between
a vulnerability factor and an outcome, (b) the outcome should be preceded by the
vulnerability factor in time, and (c) a third variable should not better explain the
correlation between the outcome and the vulnerability factor (i.e., the relationship should
be non-spurious).
There is evidence that the lower-order fear of the loss of cognitive control is the
factor that may, in large part, provide the relationship (Taylor et aI., 1996; Cox, Enns,
Freeman, & Walker, 2001). Problems with concentration and decision-making are
typically included in depression, and this may support the fear of the loss of cognitive
control as a risk factor for anxiety. People who have specific fears of these symptoms
(i.e., phrenophobics) would become more anxious when experiencing these conditions
(Taylor et al. 1996; Cox et aI., 2001). The fear of the loss of cognitive control is also
conceptually consistent with anxiety sensitivity. This is due to the fact that symptoms
such as poor concentration, and symptoms that are thought to be related, such as
derealization and depersonalization, could lead to specitIc fears (e.g., fear of mental
incompetence or irreversible depression; Cox et aI., 2001). It is also plausible that the
same attributional style associated with anxiety sensitivity is related to cognitive
distortions, such as catastrophizing or likelihood overestimation, that lead to depression
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(Otto et al. 1995). Also, the symptoms of anxiety and depression covary, and this may be
the link between anxiety sensitivity and depression, no matter what might constitute the
underlying mechanism (Schmidt et al. 1998).
Determining whether or not anxiety sensitivity is a specific vulnerability factor in
the development of anxiety and depression was the purpose of a previously mentioned
study (Schmidt et aI., 1998). It included both a large nonclinical sample (N = 1401) of
military recruits undergoing basic training at a service academy, as well as a patient
sample (N = 53), which included patients with panic disorder participating in a cognitive
behavioral treatment outcome study. This was the first study to support anxiety
sensitivity as a risk factor for anxiety in the context of criteria needed in quasiexperimental research designs (i.e., covariance, temporal antecedence, and nonspuriousness~

Schmidt et al. 1998).

Anxiety sensitivity was not found to be predictive of depression. Possibly this is
due to the well-established overlap of anxiety and depression (r range: 0.25-0.60) and the
stringent requirement of symptom specificity. It is possible to argue, nevertheless, that
there are both unique and overlapping features in depression and anxiety, as has been put
forth in the tripartite model examined by Clark and Watson (1991) and Brown, Barlow,
and Chorpita (1998). This model, supported by a significant body of research, contains
an anxiety-specific factor (i.e., physiological hyperarousal), as well as a factor that is
unique to depression (i.e., anhedonia). This model provided the backgrOlmd for the
covariance strategy used in the study conducted by Brown et aI. (1998) that identified the
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common feature tor anxiety and depression (i.e., negative affect) and supported a more
accurate analysis of the features which are unique to each (Schmidt et al., 1998).
It is possible, when viewing the tripartite model, to see a link between anxiety
sensitivity and hyperarousal, while anxiety sensitivity and anhedonia do not appear to
have the specific relationship of risk factor and symptoms. This coincides with the view
of elevated anxiety sensitivity as the predictive factor for panic attacks and panic
disorder, which are perhaps the most typical examples of hyperarousal (Schmidt et aI.,
1998). This does not mean that some of the related symptoms of depression are not

increased by anxiety sensitivity in the presence of anxiety symptoms. Again, when
viewing the tripartite model, it might be possible to see that atL'(iety sensitivity increases
negative affect at non-specific levels, while not directly having an influence on ahedonia
(Schmidt et aI., 1998), Also, as mentioned earlier in Taylor et al. (1996), an analysis of
one of the first-order factors of anxiety sensitivity linked it with depression. The anxiety
sensitivity factor, the fear of the loss of cognitive control, was found to be linked with
both the unique features of anxiety and the unique features of depression (Schmidt et al.
1998; Zinbarg et al., 2001).

AnXiety Sensitivity: Dimensional or Categorical

Testing variables of interest for dimensionality is rarely done, but this factor can
have great importance in the areas of theory and assessment. Work on this issue has
begun (Taylor, Cox, Freeman, McNally, Stewart, & Swinson, 1999), and is using
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recently formulated taxometric methods (Waller & Meehl, 1998). Whether a set of data
serves as an example of a single dimensional variable or two potential, well-documented
categories, can be detennined with these statistical procedures. These procedures were
used with a data set of ASI scores from 546 individuals with panic disorder (ASI mean =
35.3, SD = l2.0) and a sample of 546 university students used as the nonclinical controls
(AS I mean = 19.3, SD

9.8; Taylor et aI., 1999). If anxiety sensitivity is categorical

(taxonic), high anxiety sensitivity people will have a higher risk for psychopathology,
especially panic attacks, and low anxiety sensitivity people will be at low risk. The taxon
will be most of the people in the panic disorder group and the complement will be
members of the control group (Taylor et a1. 1999).
Factor analysis of the ASI has provided evidence that an,xiety sensitivity is made
up of at least three lower order factors that load on a single higher order factor in a
hierarchical structure (Zinbarg et aI., 1999). In order to conduct analyses on the lower
order factors, more items are needed than are contained in the ASI. Therefore, this study
had to be confined to analyses of the higher order factor (Taylor et a1. 1999). All eight
ASl items, which were used to form four miniscales in order to meet the criteria for this
type of statistical procedure, had salient loadings on the higher order anxiety sensitivity
factor in this study (Taylor et aL 1999), The same was tound to be true in two other
studies (Stewart et aI., 1997; Zinbarg et aI., 1997),
Three of six covariance analyses, which were based on the four miniscales,
provide clear evidence that anxiety sensitivity is dimensionaL The other three suggest
that anxiety sensitivity is either dimensional, or that there is a category (taxon) present
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10%). Ifless than or equal to 10% of the combined sample of

panickers and students (i.e" 110 individuals) consists of a high anxiety sensitivity
category ( taxon), such a taxon could be present (Meehl & Yonce, 1996), If it could be
established that such a low base rate taxon is present, then anxiety sensitivity would be
categorical rather than dimensional.
However, it is suggested by the initial results of this study that anxiety sensitivity
is dimensional and that it is not taxonic (categorical). First, three out of six covariance
analyses clearly suggest that anxiety sensitivity is dimensionaL Second, the majority of
the sample of panic disordered individuals would not be included in the taxon, since a
low base-rate taxon would be less than or equal to 10% of the combined sample, while
half of the sample was diagnosed with panic disorder. If there is a taxon, it is supposed to
represent the group that is at high risk for psychopathology (Taylor et al. 1999).
If the base rate were 10%, the taxon group (n = 110) would have a mean ASI
score of 51.8 (a range of 43~63). It would be made up of 106 individuals with panic
disorder and 4 controls. This taxon would contain only 19% of the people with panic
disorder. The rest of the people who regularly experience panic attacks, along with
almost all of the students, would be part of the complement group. Therefore, people
who have a high risk factor for psychopathology are not identified, and little
psychological sense is made by a low base-rate taxon (Taylor et al. 1999). It follows,
then, that the tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the initial part of this study is
that anxiety sensitivity, as a higher order construct, is dimensional (Taylor et at. 1999).
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EVidencefor the Hierarchical Structure and Factor Saturation of the AS!

Evaluating the evidence regarding the validity of the anxiety sensitivity construct
and its most prominent measure, the ASI, is important due to the significant part played
by anxiety sensitivity in the current conceptualizations of panic disorder and the other
anxiety disorders (Zinbarg et al., 1999). Distinct factors may be linked to distinct
mechanisms (Cattell, 1978) in, for instance, the etiology of anxiety reactions. One way in
which to address these issues is factor analysis (Taylor & Cox, 1998). Currently, the
factor structure of the ASI has been analyzed in 12 published studies and two or more
unpublished factor~analytic studies with inconsistent results. As noted in earlier reviews
of these studies, there has been support for a unidimensional structure and
multidimensional structures that include up to four factors (Lilienfeld et al., 1993;
McNally, 1996; Taylor, 1995a, 1995b).
How can a hierarchical structure hypothesis account for these contradictory
results? Apparently differences in the number of factors extracted across studies are
considered to be reasonable (a) when a hierarchical structure exists, and (b) when no
differentiation between higher and lower level factors is directing the decision by
investigators on the optimal number of factors (Goldberg & Dig man, 1994). This
appears to have been the case due to the fact that the hypothesis was not stated until fairly
recently (i.e., Lilienfeld et al. 1993). This hypothesis proposes a model that contains three
correlated first-order factors, which are aspects of anxiety sensitivity that load on a
single, higher order factor. This higher order factor is thought to be trait anxiety, which
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in turn, is thought to be an aspect of negative affectivity (neuroticism; Cox, 1996;
Zinbarg et aI., 1997).
Therefore, many of the contradictory results in the currently existing body of
research can be integrated if the hierarchical model is valid (Zinbarg et aI., 1997). It also
appears that those who argued for a multifactor solution were interested in the lower level
ofthe hierarchy (e.g., TeIch, Shennis, & Lucas, 1989; Wardle, Ahmad & Hayward,
1990), while those who argued for a single-factor solution were interested in the higher
level (e.g., Reiss et aI., 1986; Taylor et at, 1991; Taylor et aI., 1992). Exploratory and
confirmatory factor-analytic procedures have been used as strategies in research that has
explored the hierarchical aspect of the factor structure of the AS!. The methods used by
Peterson and Heilbronner (1987), and those used in several more recent studies, have
been appropriate for this type of testing. An oblique rotation was used by Peterson and
Heilbronner (1987), whose results showed moderate correlations among their first-order
factors. It was also used by Taylor, Koch et at, (1996), whose results showed weak to
moderate correlations for their three first-order factors (Zinbarg et aI., 1999).
There is evidence for a possible second-order factor (i.e., anxiety sensitivity) in
the first-order factor correlations in each of these studies. In addition to reporting a
moderate correlation among their three first-order factors, Stewart et aI., (1997) found
evidence of a single second-order factor when they completed a higher order factor
analysis of the correlations among their first-order factors. Clearly, this second order
factor was a general factor because, in relating the items directly to the second order
factor, all 16 items of the ASI were found to have salient loadings on this factor (Zinbarg
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et aI., 1999). Both panic-disorder patients and college students served as samples for
several confirmatory factor analyses. In these analyses a unidimensional model and
several four-factor models, which were based on the results of Peterson and Heilbronner
(1987), TeIch et a1. (1989), and Wardel et al. (1990), were compared (Cox, Parker et aI.,
1996). After oblique and orthogonal solutions were examined with the four~factor
models, it was discovered that neither the orthogonal

four~factor models

nor the

unidimensional model fit patient or student data. On the other hand, the oblique fourfactor models were found to provide acceptable levels of fit. They were also significantly
better fits for both the patient and student sample data than the unidimensional models
(Cox et a1. 1996; Zinbarg et aI., 1999).
These results provide evidence for a hierarchical factor structure for the ASI made
up of several first-order factors, in addition to at least one second-order factor. This is
due to the fact that oblique factors suggest the existence of higher order factors (Gorsuch,
1983~

Zinbarg et at, 1999). A factor analysis of the conelations among the factors for

the oblique four-factor model in the Cox et at. (] 996) study suggests a second-order
factor in both patient and student samples. The smallest of the four loadings of the firstorder factors on the second-order factor for the patient sample was .60, and .52 for the
student sample, indicating a very strong second-order factor (Zinbarg et aI., 1999). Any
estimate of general factor saturation above .50 is considered to be evidence that the total
score is mainly a measure of a single construct (i,e., anxiety sensitivity; Zinbarg et aI.,
1997).
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Zinbarg et a1. (1997) examined a hierarchical model that was made of three
orthogonal factors labeled as Anxiety Sensitivity-Physical Concerns, Anxiety Sensitivity~
Mental Incapacitation Concerns, and Anxiety Sensitivity-Social Concerns in which each
loaded on a single second-order factor rather than having the limitation of being
orthogonal. Also examined were a unidimensional model and a model with the same
three orthogonal factors. The hierarchical model afforded a fit that was significantly
better than the others, when applied to the data of their anxiety disordered outpatient
sample. Evidence was provided by a Schmid-Leiman transformation on the factor
pattern matrix that the second order factor is a general factor. This consisted of the fact
that 15 of the 16 ASI items had a loading of.30 or greater on this factor (Zinbarg et aI.,
1997). Very similar results were found in a study conducted by Stewart et al. (1997).
Based on these results, the following detenninations have been made (Zinbarg et
aI., 1999): (a) three partially discrete first-order factors and one general, second-order
factor make up the hierarchical factor structure of the AS!, (b) Anxiety SensitivityPhysical COl1cerns, Anxiety Sensitivity-Mental Incapacitation Concerns, and Anxiety
Sensitivity-Social Concerns are factor names, which are in agreement with items that tap
for corresponding concerns on the AS! (Zinbarg et al., 1997), and (c) across populations
used most often for evaluation of the ASI, which are anxiety-disordered outpatients and
college students, results suggest that this hierarchical structure is quite similar (Zinbarg et
a1., 1999). Evidence for a higher order general factor does not justity, psychometrically,
the use of a total score from a set of items such as the AS!. Before this is appropriate, the
scale's general factor saturation, or the proportion of variance in the total scores
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accounted for by the general factor, must be examined (Cronbach, 1951; Revelle, 1979;
Zinbarg et at, 1997). Preliminary findings from this type of analysis of the ASI resulted
in the estimation that the second-order, general factor explains approximately 60% of the
variance in total scores (Zinbarg et aI., 1997). Use of the ASI total score as a
representative measure of the anxiety sensitivity construct, therefore, appears to be
justified, but replication of these findings is needed (Zinbarget aI., 1999).
Regarding the methodological implications of the hierarchical model of anxiety
sensitivity, it is important to be aware that most studies that have explored this area have
used ASI total scores and not the subscales which are representative of the first-order
anxiety sensitivity factors, with the exceptions of Stewart et al. (1997), Taylor et aI.
(1996), and Zinbarg et aI. (1997). Whether the significant relationships between ASI
total scores and several criteria that have been revealed in these studies are caused by the
second-order, general anxiety sensitivity factor or one or more of the first-order factors is
not clear (Zinbarg et al., 1999).
In addition, due to the fact that the subscales, which are linked to the lower order
anxiety sensitivity factors, were not included in these studies, it is not possible to
determine whether incremental validity of the second-order general factor, or one or more
of the first-order anxiety sensitivity factors has been supported. It is impossible to tell
what factor is predicting various criteria, even after controlling for trait anxiety
(Lilienfeld, 1996; Lilienfeld et al., 1993; McNally, 1989, 1996; Reiss, 1991). Reanalyses
of these studies using the ASI can he perfonned which calculate and analyze the
subscales that are related to the first-order anxiety sensitivity factors. This process will
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aid in deciding which level ofthe anxiety sensitivity hierarchy plays a part in producing
pathology (Zinbarg et al., 1999).
In fact, this work has begun (Zinbarg et aI., 2001) with the following findings
based on a previous study (Rapee, Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992) that assessed fear
responses to hyperventilation and 5.5% carbon dioxide challenges: (1) the strongest
positive linear relation with panic-related phenomena among the three underlying factors
of the ASI is shown by Anxiety Sensitivity-Physical Concerns and (2) the strongest
positive linear relation with depressed mood is shown by Anxiety Sensitivity-Mental
Incapacitation. Of course, it must be kept in mind that the challenges used were most
congruent with the physical concerns factor of anxiety sensitivity and not with social
threat or mental challenge. In addition, the results suggest a mediating role for some
fairly general, non-specific anxiety components. Supportive of some specificity to panic
disorder is the finding that subjects with panic disorder were more distressed by these
challenges than subjects with other anxiety disorders. On the other hand, some degree of
non-specificity is supported by the fact that the latter group of subjects showed greater
distress in response to these challenges than did non-anxious controls (Rapee et aI., 1992;
Zinbarg et aI., 2001 ).

Factor Structure ofOther Measures ofAnxiety Sensitivity

It is useful to examine other measures of anxiety sensitivity in order to detennine

whether or not there is agreement with the results of studies on the ASI factor structure.
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Agreement will provide further support for the concept that anxiety sensitivity is a
construct with a hierarchical structure, In fact, evidence supporting the
multidimensionality of anxiety sensitivity has been found in all seven studies reported at
this time. These include three studies of the Agoraphobia Cognitions Questionnaire
(ACQ) and the Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ; Arrindell, 1993; Chambless,
Caputo, Bright, & Gallagher, 1984; Marks, Basoglu, Alkubaisy, Sengun, & Marks,
1991), one of the Agoraphobic Cognitions Scale (ACS; Hoffart, Friis, & Martinsen,
1992), one ofthe Anxiety Sensitivity Beliefs Scale (ASBS; Kenardy, Evans, & Oel,
1992), and two of the Panic Appraisal Inventory (PAl; Feske & DeBeurs, 1996; Teich et
aI., 1989), Five of the studies contained tests of the possible hierarchical structure of
anxiety sensitivity and four of them provided evidence that suggests a hierarchical model
(Zinbarg et aI., 1999).
The 60·item Anxiety Sensitivity Profile (ASP; Taylor & Cox, 1998) was
developed in answer to concerns that the ASI may not have enough items to represent the
type and number oflower-order factors of anxiety sensitivity (Zinbarg et aI., 1997), At
this point it has been used in a study that involved 349 tmiversity students. Evidence for
four lower-order factors was provided by factor analysis: (1) fear of respiratory
symptoms, (2) fear of cognitive dyscontrol, (3) fear of gastrointestinal symptoms, and (4)
fear of cardiac symptoms. These factors loaded on and shared variance with a single
higher-order factor, while also having unique variance. It is suggested by these results
that anxiety sensitivity consists of independent contributions from four specific factors,
while being the product of a general factor (Taylor & Cox, 1998),
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While there is only a small amount of evidence that supports the construct validity
of any of these measures, making it impossible to draw any firm conclusions from any of
these studies when considered alone, the degree of convergence of the results across these
studies is impressive. Also impressive is the amount of convergence between the results
of these studies and the results from studies on the ASI factor structure. The fact that the
convergence of results exists across different measures, rather than on one specific
measure (e.g., ASI), provides evidence that anxiety sensitivity is part of a hierarchical
structure (Zinbarg et al., 1999).

Relationship a/Trait Anxiety and Anxiety Sensitivity in the Hierarchical Structure

The identification of individual difference variables plays a significant part in
understanding the etiology of anxiety pathology. They are also important constructs that
need to be considered in prevention, treatment, and symptom maintenance. Two such
constructs are anxiety sensitivity and trait anxiety. There is a great deal of variation in
people's tendency to experience anxiety. A small provocation will result in the
experience of anxiety symptoms by some, but others require the occurrence of extremely
stressful circumstances before they report anxiety. These variations in anxiety proneness
are indicated in the construct of trait anxiety (Reiss & McNally, 1985). The same
individual differences among people are found in their fear of anxiety symptoms. While
some people view them with anticipated anxiety, most view anxiety as no more than
unpleasant. These individual differences are indicated in the construct of anxiety
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sensitivity (Reiss & McNally, 1985). Beliefs that the symptoms of anxiety are hannful
provide the basis for the fears of anxiety symptoms to which anxiety sensitivity refers.
While a person with low anxiety sensitivity regards heart palpitations as no more than an
unpleasant sensation, a person with high anxiety sensitivity may be certain that a heart
attack is imminent. The leading measure of these variations in anxiety sensitivity has
been the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Peterson & Reiss, 1992; Reiss et at, 1986).
There were questions about whether or not trait anxiety and anxiety sensitivity are
distinct entities subsequent to the initial studies of anxiety sensitivity. It was suggested
that the ASI simply measures trait anxiety (Lilienfeld, 1996a, 1996b; Lilienfeld, Jacob, &
Turner, 1989, 1993, 1996). Further empirical studies (e.g., Rapee & Medoro, 1994) and
refinement of the concept of anxiety sensitivity (McNally, 1989, 1996a; 1996b; Taylor
1995, 1996) were the responses to these questions (McNally, 1999). There now appears
to be agreement that anxiety sensitivity plainly indicates an empirically and conceptually
distinct individual difference variable. Trait anxiety is now viewed as a higher order or
third-order construct indicative of an individual who tends generally to experience fear in
response to stressors (Lilienfeld et al., 1993). Anxiety sensitivity is indicative of an
individual who tends specifically to experience fear in response to his or her own anxiety
symptoms. It is now viewed as a lower-order or second-order construct. According to
Reiss (1987, 1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985) factors of injury sensitivity and fear of
negative evaluation covary with anxiety sensitivity as a result of their loadings on the
third-order trait anxiety factor (Lilienfeld, 1996b; McNally, 1989). The notion that
provides a basis for the modest correlation between measures of anxiety sensitivity and
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those of trait anxiety is that anxiety sensitivity is an aspect of trait anxiety (Lilienfeld,
1996a).
Quite a lot has been accomplished to support the view that anxiety sensitivity is
not merely a part of trait anxiety. Indeed, following a review of 11 studies that contained
correlations between measures of trait anxiety and the ASI, it was detennined that trait
anxiety and anxiety sensitivity are related but separable constructs (McNally, 1996;
Reiss, 1991). This agrees with Lilienfeld et aI's (1993) proposed hierarchical structure.
Use of the ACQ and BSQ also provided confirming evidence that anxiety sensitivity and
trait anxiety are related but separable constructs (Chambless et al. 1984). The hypotheses
that trait anxiety is a third-order factor and anxiety sensitivity is one of several secondorder factors that can be broken down into first-order anxiety sensitivity factors agree
with initial factor analytic evidence provided by Taylor (1995) and Zinbarg and Barlow
(1996).

Limitations on the Dimensionality ofAnxiety Sensitivity in the Current Literature

Children and older adults. Little has been done to examine the dimensionality of
anxiety sensitivity in children and older adults. Confinnatory factor analysis has been
initiated on the CASI to explore various models of its structure with preliminary evidence
supporting multidimensionality in both child patients and nonpatients (Silverman, 1993).
Data has recently been collected on the ASI from a group of community volunteers ages

Anxiety Sensitivity: Validity of the ASP

79

65 to 97, but there are no known reports in existence on this age group (Zinbarg et aI.,
1997).

Construct validity. This is an area of significance especially for assessment, as
well as ultimately for prevention, treatment, and treatment maintenance. Current and
future analyses of the construct validity of the measures of anxiety sensitivity can provide
vital information about the extent of their usefulness. Preliminary evidence supports the
construct validity of the three first-order anxiety sensitivity factors identified with
analysis of the ASI. On the other hand, whether or not the subscales provide differential
predictive vaHdity with such clinically important variables as response to panic
provocation procedures, treatment response, and course of disorder is not yet known.
Therefore it cannot yet be concluded that distinguishing among these constructs is
clinically important (Zinbarg et at, 1999). Reanalysis of data from earlier studies of
panic provocation and panic control therapy is currently in process (Zinbarg et aI., 1999;
Barlow & coJ]eagues, 1999) and one has been completed, as mentioned earlier (Zinbarg
et aI., 2001).

To Summarize

There are a number of theoretical pieces which have been addressed by the
current study. The earliest attempt at providing a theoretical framework for anxiety
sensitivity (Le., expectancy theory; Reiss, 1980, 1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985; Taylor &
Fedora, 1999) suggests that it has been perceived as having a unifactorial structure. It has
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also been viewed as a multifactorial concept consisting of a general factor and three
lower-order factors (Lilienfeld et aL, 1996; Taylor, 1996). This study may provide
support for the concept that anxiety sensitivity is a multifactorial construct consisting of
anxiety sensitivity and six underlying factors. Evidence may be provided for reliability
and validity that will add to the evidence provided by previous studies that anxiety
sensitivity is not an artifact of another construct such as the fear of pain or another trait.
A handful of studies have suggested questions about expectancy theory's efforts
to link anxiety sensitivity and expectancy in order to explain fear, panic, and avoidance.

It is argued that the theory needs to be expanded and modified to address all of these
findings. Expectancy theory also claims that anxiety sensitivity is one of three
fundamental fears. More recently the possibility has been suggested that it is not a fear,
but a variable moderating fear. The results of one study suggest the role of partial
mediator (Stewart et aI., 2001). It is argued that it is quite possible that a mediating role
will be fOlmd for anxiety sensitivity. However, there is not yet enough evidence to
support that claim.
Returning to the issue of underlying factors, the factor labeled the fear of
observable reactions to anxiety has often been found in factor-analytic studies of the AS!.
There have been suggestions, however, that the fear of negative evaluation, one of the
three fundamental fears identified in expectancy theory (Reiss, 1980, 1991; Reiss &
McNally, t 985; Taylor & .Fedora, 1999), may be too heavily represented in the ASI items
(Cox et aI. 1999). The current study provides evidence that if there are adequate items to
assess this fear with a clinical sample, these items may provide the range of scores that
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are sufficient to provide both high reliability and convergent validity for this domain. In
addition to evidence for the existence of this underlying factor, there is a growing body of
evidence that supports the view that elevated anxiety sensitivity is present across anxiety
disorders (Taylor et al., 1992). The nature of the clinical sample in the current study (i.e.,
representation of all anxiety disorders) provides support that is consistent with theoretical
and empirical efforts of the past 20 years). That is to say, that anxiety sensitivity plays a
role in the disposition and etiology of anxiety disorders in general, and panic disorder in
particular (Zinbarg et at, 1999); Barlow, 1988, 1991; Clark, 1986; Goldstein &
Chambless, 1987; McNally, 1990; Reiss, 1991; Reiss & McNally, 1985; Reiss et at,
1986).
Related to etiology is the issue of cognitive biases in the online processing of
anxiety sensations. There is some agreement that the utilization of congruence between
threat cues and beliefs will increase consistency in the results of the investigation of the
role played by attentional, memory, and interoceptive acuity biases in the processing of
anxiety sensations. It is important to know whether or not those who are at risk for the
development of panic and other anxiety disorders have the same biases as those who
currently experience the symptoms of those disorders. The current study may provide
evidence that the ASP is a psychometrically superior measure that will provide a better
assessment of beliefs about bodily sensations.
Etiology also includes the relationship of the personality domains and the anxiety
sensitivity construct. Recently there has been some focus on the differences and
similarities between the anxiety sensitivity construct and the personality domains of
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neuroticism and trait anxiety (Reiss, 1993), Whether neuroticism precedes anxiety
sensitivity, or anxiety sensitivity precedes neuroticism, is unknown at this time
(Lilienfeld, 1999). A recent study that included the ASP (Van der Does et at, 2003)
found a significant relationship for anxiety sensitivity and harm avoidance, an underlying
factor for the higher order dimension of Constraint, a fearfulness or response inhibition
dimension (Telegen, 1978, 1982; Telegen & Waller, 1994). Continued research in this
area will further inform theory and all phases of intervention, The current study provides
evidence that the ASP is the measure that will be the most accurate in the identification of
the underlying factors of anxiety sensitivity, as well as the anxiety sensitivity construct
when utilized in these investigations.
While utilizing the ASI and factor analysis in related research, evidence has been
found for a hierarchical structure of the anxiety sensitivity construct. Results have been
contradictory due to choices by investigators to focus on the upper or lower level, or to
make no differentiation between higher and lower level factors, Accurately establishing
the validity of the anxiety sensitivity construct, its measures, and the factors which make
up the structure is important. This is due to the fact that distinct factors may be linked to
distinct mechanisms (Cattell, 1978)in, for instance, the etiology of anxiety reactions
(Zinbarg et aI., 1999), Since the ASI subscales, which are linked to the lower order
anxiety sensitivity factors, have not been included in most studies, support for
incremental validity of either the general anxiety sensitivity factor or the lower order
factors has not been determined (Lilienfeld, 1996; Lilienfeld et a1. 1993; McNally, 1989,
1996~

Reiss, 1991), Even with recent reanalyses that calculate and analyze the subscales
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(Zinbarg et aI., 2001), there continue to be problems because the reliability of the ASI
subscales has been questioned (Zinbarg et aI., 1997).
As reported previously, the current study may provide evidence with a clinical
sample that the ASP is psychometrically superior to the ASI because it has been designed
to address the issues previously presented. All the items in the ASP appear to be specific
to the anxiety sensitivity construct. In addition, the ASP has a sufficient number of items
to establish internal consistency reliability and convergent validity for each scale. These
are steps that are necessary, although not sufficient, to establish the construct validity ofa
measure. A sufficient number of items on each scale will also increase the possibility
that the lower-order factors of anxiety sensitivity will be more accurately identified
(Taylor & Cox, 1998).

Specific Hypotheses

To supply further support for the convergent validity of the ASP, the primary goal
of this study was to correlate the subscale scores of the ASP with the full scores of the
ASl It was predicted that sub scale scores for the ASP would tend to have large
correlations with the ASI (i.e., rs ~ 0.50; Cohen, 1988). Consideration of the relationship
of the ASP subscales with trait anxiety (anxiety proneness) was the secondary aim. Trait
anxiety was evaluated with the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(Spielberger, 1983). It was predicted that a modest relationship (correlation) would be
found between the ASP subscales and trait anxiety. Such a relationship was found by
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Taylor & Cox (1998) when using a

non~clinical

sample. Modest correlations (r s::::;

0.30) have been found in earlier studies between trait anxiety and anxiety sensitivity,
when it was assessed by the ASI.
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Chapter 2

Methods

Participants

One hundred five subjects were selected. A subset of the subjects was in
treatment at health clinics, private practices, and an anxiety disorder treatment center.
Other subjects were members of anxiety disorder support groups, students at the
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, or attendees of the 2003 Anxiety
Disorders Association of America Conference. All were selected on the basis of the
experience of anxiety symptoms. This was done in order to meet the goal of this study,
which was to seek convergent validity tor a new measure of anxiety sensitivity based on
data derived from a clinical sample. Subjects were recruited with the use of flyers
presented by mental health care providers and support group leaders. Flyers were also
posted at the ADAA conference and in the e-mail of all the students at the Philadelphia
College of Osteopathic Medicine. All participants were volunteers who were offered and
paid $20 for an average of one hour of their time.
Participation criteria included: (1) being between 18 and 65 years of age, (2) a
DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis of one or more anxiety disorders, (3) no diagnosis of current
substance dependence, and (4) no diagnosis of current or past schizophrenia, current
bipolar disorder, or organic mental disorder. Patients could be diagnosed with other
DSM-IV disorders. The following anxiety disorders were represented: obsessivecompulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, panic
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disorder with and without agoraphobi~ agoraphobia without panic, social phobia,
specific phobia, acute stress disorder, anxiety disorder due to a general medical condition,
and anxiety disorder not otherwise specified. Based on the inclusion and exclusion
criteria, 105 subjects were selected for the study. Subjects were between the ages of 19
and 65 and consisted of69 females and 36 males. All educational levels (i.e., grade 6 or
less through completion of graduate or professional school) were represented. All
categories of employment status were represented, including early retirement and
disability. Retirement after age 65 was not represented due to the exclusionary
requirement of age 66 and above. All categories of marital status were represented.
Caucasian, Asian, Black, East Indian, and other ethnicities were represented.

Overview ofthe Research DeSign

The ASP was initially designed by Taylor & Cox (1998) for the purpose of
performing a more extensive exploration of the factor structure of anxiety sensitivity with
a nonclinical sample. A more inclusive evaluation of the factors, which are part of
anxiety sensitivity, might be given by a measure like the ASP, in which items have been
expanded to measure domains that have been found to be present in the ASI, but not
always factorially demonstrated in this scale. Before the usefulness of the ASP can be
evaluated, however, more factor-analytic studies with normative and clinical populations,
as well as reliability and validity studies are needed (Peterson & Plehn, 1999).
This study was a correlational design. It was designed to evaluate convergent
validity of the ASP through replication of the correlational aspect of their study (Taylor
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& Cox, 1998), while using a clinical sample. Previous factor analytic studies of the ASI
(Taylor, 1996) have suggested that anxiety sensitivity consists of six domains, which
have been evaluated in the six lO-item scales of the ASP (Taylor & Cox, 1998). In this
study patients were asked to report the degree of danger the symptoms presented from
each of these domains: (1) fear of cardiovascular symptoms, (2) fear of respiratory
symptoms, (3) fear of gastrointestinal symptoms, (4) fear of publicly observable anxiety
reactions, (5) fear of
dissociative and neurological symptoms, and (6) fear of cognitive dyscontrol (Taylor &
Cox, 1998; Peterson & Plehn, 1999).
The SCID-IIP (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1994) was used to support
concurrent validity through comparison of its suggested diagnosis with the diagnosis
assigned by clinicians employing interview techniques (Aiken, 1996). The ASI was
included so that convergent validity of the ASP could be evaluated by correlating the
subscale scores on the ASP with the total scores of the AS!. The State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) was included in order to provide infonnation on the
relationship between the ASP subs cales and trait anxiety (i.e., discriminant validity;
Aiken, 1996; Cox & Taylor, 1998).
Most subjects were assessed individually. Completion of the measures: (1) ASP,
(2) ASI, and (3) Trait portion of the STAr was followed by completion of the
computerized version of the SCID-IfP. However, when assessing 19 members of two of
the support groups, two subjects were assessed simultaneously. In those situations, half of
the subjects completed the paper and pencil measures after they completed the SCID-IIP.
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Subjects were given the option of answering the questions of the SCID-llP as they were
read by the investigator, or using the computer to answer the questions themselves. All
assessments were administered by the investigator.

Measures

The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) is a 16-item self-report questionnaire that
measures the amount of concern that the individual has about the hannful consequences
of anxiety and anxiety-related sensations that are the result of elevated autonomic arousal
(peterson & Reiss, 1992; Reiss et ai., 1986; Zinbarg et aI., 1999). Each item is rated on a
5-point Likert scale (range from very little to very much). The total score, which ranges
from 0 to 64, is obtained by finding the sum of the item scores (peterson & Plehn, 1999;
Richards & Bertram, 2000; Watt et ai., 1998). While the majority of the items focus on
the fear of physical sensations, a few items touch on beliefs about mental control (e.g.,
inability to concentrate) and the observation by others of symptoms of anxiety (e.g.,
noticing shakiness; Peterson & Plehn, 1999).
Good psychometric properties of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index, including its
incremental validity as a measure of the fear of anxiety, and factorial distinction from
state or trait anxiety (McNally, 1994; Taylor et at., 1991), are supported by a significant
body of evidence (Silverman & Weems, 1999; Watt et ai., 1998). Good internal
consistency (peterson & Heilbronner, 1987; Taylor et aI., 1991; Teich et aI., 1989), testretest reliability (Maller & Reiss, 1992; Reiss et ai., 1986), and predictive validity
(peterson & Reiss, 1992; Reiss, 1991) have been well-documented in over 100 peer-
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reviewed journal articles (Zinbarg et aI., 1999). Differential concurrent validity for the
three lower-order factors has been reported (Stewart et aI., 1997; Tayloret aI., 1996;
Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996; Zinbarg et aI., 1997).
The Anxiety Sensitivity Profile is a 60-item self-report questionnaire that
measures the extent to which individuals agree with items on a 7-point Likert scale (range
from likely to not likely). As reported earlier, the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile is made up
of six scales. A single higher order factor with four lower order factors, each of which
contains unique variance, was suggested by exploratory factor analysis on a sample of
349 college students. The lower order factors were named: (1) fear of respiratory
distress, (2) fear of cognitive dyscontrol, (3) fear of gastrointestinal symptoms, and (4)
fear of cardiac symptoms (Peterson & Plehn, 1999; Taylor & Cox, 1998; Van der Does et
aI.,2003).
Good levels of internal consistency were found for all six scales of the Anxiety
Sensitivity Profile and the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile factors generally had large
correlations (rs

~

0.50) with the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Taylor & Cox, 1998). This

relationship provides support for the convergent validity of the Anxiety Sensitivity
Profile with a non-clinical sample. Also, modest correlations with the trait version of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, with overlapping variance ranging from 1 to 8%, are
similar to findings for the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Taylor, 1996; Taylor & Cox, 1998).
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) has served
extensively to measure both state and trait anxiety levels (Richards & Bertram, 2000). Its
40 items on a 5-point Likert scale (range from almost never to almost always) reflect the
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individual's anxiety-proneness. It is supported by substantial evidence as a
psychometrically sound measure (peterson & Reiss, 1987; Spielberger, 1983). It is
reported to be a valid and reliable instrument that has been used extensively to measure
the levels of both state and trait anxiety (Richards & Bertram, 1999).

Procedures

Subjects were recruited from the following sites: healthcare clinics, Anxiety and
Agoraphobia Treatment Center, private practices, and a mental health clinic. Patients
who presented with anxiety symptoms were given a flier about the study. The majority
of subjects were given the flier by their treatment provider. Three subjects were given the
flier by the intake clinician. Anxiety support group leaders informed group members
about the study and gave fliers to potential subjects. At the Philadelphia College of
Osteopathic Medicine, the flier about the study was e-mailed to all students. The flier
told potential subjects where the assessment would take place, the setting, the available
times, and the purpose. It contained the investigator's name and phone number and space
for their names and phone number. It also contained the possible risks and benefits of
taking part in the study. Subjects' signatures on the flier meant that the investigator had
permission to get in touch with them about participation in the study. Those who signed
the flier were contacted by phone. Any questions posed by potential subjects were
answered. Those who chose to participate decided on an appointment date and time with
the investigator. Subjects who participated at the Anxiety Disorders Association of
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America conference (ADAA) responded to a poster and the flier. They signed up for an
assessment time during the conference with the investigator. All subjects whose response
was connected to presentation of the flier by a treatment provider participated at their
treatment site. Support group members participated at their meeting site or in their
homes. ADAA conference attendees participated at the conference site.
Prior to the actual administration of the measures, all subjects at all sites were
given a letter and an informed consent form. These explained the study in detail,
including how long the testing would take, what would be done, and the fact that their
confidentiality was protected by the storage of their test materials in either a locked file
or locked room. They were informed that only the individuals involved in the
research and members of the Institutional Review Board would have access to their
records. And finally, they were given the option of having a copy of their test results sent
to their treatment provider. Subjects who chose that option were asked to sign a release of
information fonn. Subjects in treatment were also asked to sign a release of infonnation
that would accompany a fonn that requested the chart diagnoses from their treament
provider. Following this initial segment of the assessment, subjects were asked to
complete a form that requested date of birth, gender, marital status, employment status,
educational level, race, and current medications.

Most subjects then completed three paper and pencil self-report questionnaires,
which consisted of the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile, Anxiety Sensitivity Index and the
Trait portion of the State-Trait AILxiety Inventory. Each subject was asked to read a set
of written instructions that was part of each questionnaire. These required approximately
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30 minutes for completion. Most subjects were then tested individually with the
computerized version of a structured clinical interview using the SCID-lIP (First et al.,
1994), which required on average 30 minutes. As mentioned earlier, the battery and
structured clinical interview were reversed in order when members of two support groups
were tested two at a time. The investigator was available at all times to answer questions
and provided assistance when appropriate during the test period. The investigator's
presence at all assessments ensured that the conditions were carried out as intended. The
entire assessment consisted of one session and averaged one hour in length. Materials
were reviewed for suicidal thoughts within a day of administration. If a subject was
identified as actively suicidal, appropriate personnel at the treatment site, or the
individual was contacted.
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Chapter 3
Results

Based on the magnitude of factor loadings in the Taylor and Cox study (1998),
which suggests that the solution is likely to be stable (i.e., replicable; Guadagnoli &
Velicer, 1988; Taylor & Cox, 1998), the following were the expected results: (1) the
subscale scores for the ASP will have large correlations with the total scores of the ASI
(i.e., rs

~

0.50) and (2) there will be a modest, but significant correlation (rs ~ 0.30)

between the ASP subscale scores and trait anxiety (anxiety proneness), as assessed by the
trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.

Descriptive

To provide evidence for these hypotheses, one hundred five individuals who
experience anxiety symptoms (69 females and 36 males) completed the ASP, ASI, STAITrait portion, and the SCID-IJP. Thirty subjects, or 29% ofthe sample, were diagnosed
with a single anxiety disorder. Thirty-tive subjects, or 33% of the sample, were
diagnosed with two or more anxiety disorders. Forty subjects, or 38% ofthe sample,
were diagnosed with at least one anxiety disorder, and were comorbid for other Axis I
diagnoses. Thirty-four subjects or 32% of the sample were comorbid for depression. The
anxiety disorders were represented as follows: (1) 69 subjects, or 66% were diagnosed
with obsessive-compulsive disorder, (2) 38 subjects, or 36% were diagnosed with social
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phobia, (3) 35 subjects, or 33% were diagnosed with specific phobia, (4) 29 subjects, or
28% were diagnosed with agoraphobia without panic disorder, (5) 21 subjects, or 20%
were diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder, (6) 18 subjects, or 17% were
diagnosed with panic disorder with agoraphobia, (8) 14 subjects, or 13% were diagnosed
with generalized anxiety disorder, (9) 7 subjects, or 6% were diagnosed with panic
disorder without agoraphobia, (10) 1 subject, or 1% was diagnosed with anxiety due to a
general medical condition, (11) 1 subject, or 1% was diagnosed with anxiety disorder not
otherwise specified, and (12) 1 subject, or 1% was diagnosed with acute stress disorder.
Scores of central tendency and variability for the ASP subscales and ASP, ASI,
and STAl total scores are presented in Table 1. The mean total score on the ASI (ie.,
43.96) is high in relationship to the mean total score on the AS! in most studies that have
used a clinical sample (e.g., Blais et at, 2001; Stewart, et al. 2001; Taylor, 1995; Zinbarg,
et aI., 1997). In most studies high scores range from 30 to 38. In the current study, the
ASP mean total score was 210.97 (SD = 65.04). This is somewhat higher than the mean
total score in the Van der Does et a]. (2003) study, in which the ASP mean total score
was 195.9 (SD = 74.4). Taylor and Cox (1998) did not provide mean scores for their
college student sample.
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Table 1
Mean Sub scale Scores and Standard Deviations for the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile (ASP)

Cardio

3.70

1.40

Respira

4.02

1.49

Gastro

2.57

1.09

POAR

3.34

1.27

Disneuro

3.70

1.34

Cogdysc

3.77

1.45

ASP

210.97

65.04

ASI

43.96

11.67

STAI

51.24

12.15

Note. Cardio = cardiovascular fears; Respira = respiratory fears; Gastro =
gastrointestinal fears; POAR = fears of publicly observable anxiety reactions; disneuro
fears of dissociative and neurological symptoms; Cogdysc = fears of cognitive dyscontrol
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Internal Consistency

Internal consistencies (i.e., Cronbach's alpha; Cronbach, 1951) for the ASI total
score and the ASP subscale scores are presented in Table 2. These were calculated
based on the responses of the total clinical sample. Cronbach's alpha, a coefficient of
internal consistency, is a widely used reliability statistic. A recommended minimum is
0.80 (Loewenthal, 2001). The high internal reliability estimate for the ASI (i.e., .88),
which is consistent with other studies (Zinbarg, et. aI., 1997), indicates high internal
consistency. Internal reliability estimates for the subscales of the ASP ranged from .87 to
.94, demonstrating that they are highly internally consistent. These are consistent with
another study (i.e., aU subscales above .88; Van der Does et aI., 2003), that utilized the
ASP with a clinical sample, as well as Cox and Taylor (i.e., all subscales above .87; Cox
& Taylor, 1998).

Corrected item-subscale total score correlations were calculated for the ASP
factors and are presented in Table 3. These were found by correlating the score on each
item of a given factor with the corrected subscale total score. The corrected subscale
total score was obtained by adding the scores of all the items on a given factor while
excluding the targeted item. For example, for item 51 on Factor 1, the item subscale total
score correlation was found by correlating the score on item 51 with the corrected total
score (i.e., all items except 51 on Factor 1). All correlations are high, with the exception
of five items, which are in the moderate range. They range from .37 to .86.
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Table 2
Reliability Analysis of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) Total Scores and the Anxiety
Sensitivity Profile (ASP) Subscale Scores
Reliability coefficients
ASI

.88

ASP subscales
Cogdysc

.93

Disneuro

.89

POAR

.87

Gastro

.88

Respira

.94

Cardio

.92

Note. Cardio = cardiovascular fears; Respira = respiratory fears; Gastro
gastrointestinal fears; POAR = fears of publicly observable anxiety reactions; Disneuro =
fear of dissociative and neurological symptoms; Cogdysc

fear of cognitive dyscontrol
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Table 3
Corrected Item-Subscale Total Score Correlations for ASP Factors

Factor 1
Item

r

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Item

Item

Item

r

r

r

Factor 5
Item

Factor 6
r

Item

r

1

.68

3

.78

4

.57

58

.71

60

.54

56

.86

51

.68

59

.82

50

.69

48

.59

46

.53

41

.73

14

.78

37

.71

49

.67

35

.49

5

.59

36

.85

6

.74

45

.76

40

.74

24

.73

29

.62

25

.72

55

.67

19

.76

27

.68

23

.71

22

.69

7

.80

20

.72

26

.74

16

.57

33

.58

17

.68

18

.64

31

.81

21

.72

11

.65

12

.46

52

.60

44

,75

34

.45

15

.84

32

.68

38

.37

39

,69

13

.64

8

.76

30

.73

57

.47

53

.63

9

,70

2

.62

42

.70

47

.82

28

.47

10

.62

43

.63

54

.76

Note. Factor 1 = Cardiovascular; Factor 2 = Respiratory; Factor 3 = Gastrointestinal;
Factor 4 = Publicly Observable Anxiety Reactions; Factor 5 = Dissociative and
Neurological Symptoms; Factor 6 = Cognitive Dyscontrol
Q..< .01, one-tailed
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Hypothesis I

The subscale scores for the ASP will have large correlations with the total scores
ofthe ASI (Le., rs

~

0.50). Table 4 presents the results of the correlations between the

ASP subscales, the ASI total scores, and the trait version of the

Stait~Trait

Anxiety

Inventory (ST AI). To reach these results a Pearson product-moment Correlation was
used, since it is one common technique for demonstrating the validity of new tests. It
measures the degree and direction oflinear relationhip between two variables (Gravetter
& Wallnau, 2000). In addition, parametric statistical analysis, including Pearson
correlation, is suitable for interval data. Rating scales, such as those used in the ASP,
ASI, and STAI, may be treated as interval scales (Loewenthal, 2001). Since directional
predictions were made, one-tailed tests were used to establish statistical significance.

As predicted in hypothesis 1, all of the subscale scores for the ASP were found to
have large correlations (rs ~ 0.50) with the ASl These correlations range from .50 to .66,
are significant at the 0.01 level, and support the convergent validity of the six ASP
subscales. The highest correlation was between the ASI and the POAR subscale (i.e.,
fears of publicly observable anxiety reactions). This subscale and the Disneuro subscale
(ie., fear of dissociative and neurological symptoms) were not identified as factors in
factor analysis in the Taylor and Cox study (1998). However, they were identified as
factors in a more recent study that utilized the ASP with a c1inical sample in which a
factor analysis was completed (Van der Does et aI., 2003).
In Taylor and Cox (1998) a Pearson correlation was presented that includes the
four ASP subscales that were identified as factors in factor analysis. In that study, three
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of the four ASP subscales had somewhat lower correlations with the ASI (i.e., fear of
respiratory symptoms = .41,. fear of gastrointestinal symptoms

.50, and fear of cardiac

symptoms = .50) in comparison with the current study. Only the fear of cognitive
dyscontrol had a correlation (i.e., .57) that was consistent in both studies. On the other
hand, the order of the four ASP subscale correlations with the ASI from lowest to highest
in Taylor and Cox (1998) was consistent with the current study. From lowest to highest
in order they are: (1) respiratory fears, (2) cardiovascular fears, (3) gastrointestinal fears,
and (4) cognitive dyscontrol fears.
Intercorrelations between the ASP subscales in the current study ranged in size
from modest to large (i.e., .34 to .80). These correlations are partially consistent with the
other study that utilized the ASP with a clinical sample (Le., .52 to .82; Van der Does et
aI., 2003). Eleven of fifteen intercorrelations in the current study were large (rs;::: 0.50)
relationships. The largest correlation was between the Cardio subscale (Le.,
cardiovascular fears) and the Respira subscale (respiratory fears). The intercorrelations
between the four ASP subscales identified as factors in the study using a nonclinical
sample (Cox & Taylor, 1998) were in the modest range (Le., from.36 to .48). With the
exception of the correlation between cardiovascular and respiratory fears, the correlations
for the same factors occupy the lower end (i.e., .34 to .54) ofthe range for the current
study. The remaining larger correlations in the current study consist of relationships
between the other subscales and the POAR (Le., fears ofpuhlicly observable anxiety
reactions) and Disneuro (i.e., fears of dissociative and neurological symptoms) subscales.
As reported above, these domains were not identified as factors in factor analysis in the
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Taylor and Cox (1998) study, but were identified as factors in the more recent study (Van
der Does et a1. 2003),

Hypothesis 2

There will be a modest, but significant correlation (rs ~ 0.30) between the ASP
subscale scores and trait anxiety (anxiety proneness), as assessed by the trait version of
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Table 3 shows that the ASP subscales tended to have
statistically significant, although modest correlations (rs ~ 0.30) with the trait version of
the STAI. They range from .10 to .30 and were significant at the 0.05 level. These
findings are consistent with those found for the ASI in other studies (Taylor, 1996), and
support the view that AS and trait anxiety are correlated but distinct constructs (Taylor &
Cox, 1998). They are also consistent with the findings of Taylor and Cox (1998), in
which correlations of the ASP subscales and the STAI ranged from .11 to .29 with a
nonclinical sample. Additional consistencies exist between highest and lowest subscale
correlations ofthe ASP and STAI in the Taylor and Cox study (1998) and the current
study. The highest correlation for both studies was between the fear of cognitive
dyscontrol subscale and the STAI. The lowest correlations were between respiratory
fears, gastrointestinal fears, cardiovascular fears and the STAI.
Table 5 presents the results of the correlations between the ASI, ASP, and the trait
version of the STAI total scores. Because directional predictions were made, one-tailed
tests were used to establish statistical significance. The ASP total score was found to
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Table 4
Intercorrelations Between Subscales of the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile (ASP) and Total
Scores of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) and Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAr)

STAr

ASI

Cardio Respira Gastro POAR Disneuro Cogdysc

STAr
ASI

,44**

Cardio

,10

,55**

Respira

,11

.50**

.80**

Gastro

.17*

.56**

.51 **

,44**

POAR

,19*

.66**

.69**

,60**

.69**

Disneuro

.23*

.52**

.62**

.64**

.46**

.69**

Cogdysc

.30*

.57**

.40**

.34**

.54**

.68**

.. 66**

Note. Cardio = cardiovascular fears; Respira = respiratory fears; Gastro =
gastrointestinal fears; POAR = fears of publicly observable anxiety reactions; Disneuro =
fears of dissociative and neurological symptoms; Cogdysc = fear of cognitive dyscontrol
**2 < .01, one-tailed

*

p < ,05, one-tailed
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have a large correlation (rs ~ 0.50) with the ASI (i.e., .689), was significant at the 0.01
level, and supports the convergent validity of the ASP.
A useful index of the accuracy of prediction can be derived by squaring the
correlation coefficient. The resulting statistic is called the coefficient of determination
because it measures the proportion of variability in one variable that can be determined
from the relationship with the other variable (Aiken, 1996; Gravetter & Wallnau, 2000).
In the current study, the coefficient of determination for the correlation between the ASP
and ASI total scores is 0.475, so approximately 48% of the variance in the ASI total
scores can be accounted for by variability in the ASP total scores. This indicates that
52% of the variability in the ASI total scores was unaccounted for by ASP total scores.
This remainder is known as the coefficient of alienation (Aiken, 1996). The current study
is consistent with Cox and Taylor (1998), whose study used a nonclinical sample. The
coefficient of determination for the correlation between the ASP and the ASI total scores
in their study was 0.44, so approximately 44% of the variance in the ASI total scores can
be accounted for by variability in the ASP total scores. This indicates that 56% of the
variability was unaccounted for by the ASP total scores.
Table 4 also shows that the ASP total score had a statistically significant, although
modest correlation (r ~ 0.30) with the trait version of the STAI (i.e., .226), which was
significant at the 0.05 level. This finding is consistent with those found for the ASI in
other studies (Taylor, 1996), and supports the view that anxiety sensitivity and trait
anxiety are correlated, but distinct constructs (Taylor & Cox, 1998). This is also
consistent with the finding of Taylor and Cox (1998), in which the relationship between
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the ASP and the STAI was .26 with a noncIinical sampJe. In the current study the
coefficient of determination for the correlation between the ASP total scores and the
STAI total scores is 0.051, so approximately 5% of the variance in the STAI total scores
can be accounted for by the variability in the ASP total scores. This indicates that 95% of
the variability in the STAI total scores was unaccounted for by the ASP total scores. The
current study is consistent with Taylor and Cox (1998). The coefficient of determination
for the correlation between the ASP total scores and the STAI total scores in their study is
0.06, so approximately 6% of the variance in the STAI total scores can be accounted for
by the variability in the ASP scores. This indicates that 94% of the variability was
unaccounted for by the ASP total scores.
The correlation of the trait version of the STAI and the ASI in the current study is
somewhat higher (i.e., .438) in comparison with other studies (Taylor, 1996). However, it
also is in the modest range and supports the view that anxiety sensitivity and trait anxiety
are correlated but distinct constructs. In the current study, the coefficient of
determination for the correlation between the ASI and STAI total scores is 0.192, so
approximately 19% of the variance in the STAI total scores can be accounted for by the
variability in the ASI scores. This indicates that 81 % of the variability in the STAI total
scores was unaccounted for by the ASI total scores.
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Table 5
Intercorrelations between the Anxiety Sensitivity Profile (ASP), Anxiety Sensitivity
Index (ASI), and the Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAT) Total Scores

ASP
ASI

.689**

** I! < .01, one-tailed
'" IL< .05, one-tailed
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Chapter 4
Discussion

Summary and Explanation

This study has taken important steps in providing support for the construct
validity of the ASP. Taylor and Cox (1998) conducted their investigation with a
university sample. This study was the first investigation to utilize a clinical sample for
the purpose of providing support for internal consistency reliability and convergent
validity, necessary though not sufficient steps, for establishing the construct validity of an
instrument. As expected, the findings provided further evidence of convergent validity
for the ASP with the ASI, a psychometrically well~docwnented measure of anxiety
sensitivity (Zinbarg et ai., 1997). When assessing subjects who experienced the
symptoms of anxiety, the ASP was found to have a large correlational relationship with
the ASI (Taylor & Cox, 1998). The ASP was also found to have a modest correlational
relationship with the Trait portion of the STAI, a measure of anxiety proneness. Both
relationships (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity) contribute to construct validity.
This is referred to as the multitrait-multimethod approach (Aiken,

1996~

Campbell &

Fiske, 1959).
Again, these were the expected results. This expectation was based on the
magnitude of factor loadings in the Taylor and Cox study (1998), which suggested that
the solution was likely to be stable (i.e., replicable; Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; Taylor
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& Cox, 1998). Results of studies of the ASI have provided evidence that factor structures
do not vary greatly across clinical and non-clinical populations (Taylor, 1996; Zinbarg et

al., 1997), In this study, the assumption was made that the same condition applies to
correlational relationships, because they are a necessary part of factor analysis.

Convergent Findings

The internal consistency reliability results of the current study were generally
quite similar to those of Taylor and Cox (1998) and Van der Does et al. (2003). These
results demonstrate high internal consistency for the ASP subscales. This is important
because adequate (i.e., internally consistent) measures of a given content domain (scale)
are needed, although are not alone sufficient, to determine whether or not the domain
corresponds to a distinct factor (Aiken, 1996; Comrey, 1978; Taylor & Cox, 1998).
Alpha can also be used as a measure of the strength of a dimension once the existence of
a single factor has been determined (Cortina, 1993; Taylor, 1996). In addition, the
internal consistency of an instrument or subscale provides evidence that a single construct
is being assessed (Switzer, Wisniewski, Belle, Dew, & Schultz, 1999). The current study
also found generally high corrected item-subscale total score correlations. This is
another, more refined measure of coefficient alpha reliability that indexes the
cohesiveness of the scale.
The correlational results of this study were generally quite similar to those of the
Taylor and Cox study (1998). In both studies, there were large correlations between the
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ASP subscales and the ASI total score. This provides additional support for construct
validity. The significant, but modest correlation found for the ASP with the trait version
of the STAI, a measure for anxiety proneness, is consistent with the modest correlational
relationship found for the ASI in this study and others (Taylor, 1996). This provides
additional support for the view that an.xiety sensitivity and trait anxiety are correlated but
distinct constructs (Taylor & Cox, 1998).
In Taylor and Cox (1998), a Pearson product-moment correlation was presented

that includes the four ASP subscales that were identified as factors in factor analysis.
The order of the four ASP subscale correlations with the ASI total score from lowest to
highest was consistent in their study and in the current study. From lowest to highest in
order they are: (1) respiratory fears, (2) cardiovascular fears, (3) gastrointestinal fears,
and (4) cognitive dyscontrol fears. Possibly this order (i.e., lower correlations for
respiratory, cardiovascular, and gastrointestinal fears) is due to the fact that in factor
analysis of the ASI, the fears of physiological sensations have been identified as one
factor (i.e., Cox, Taylor, Borger, Fuentes, & Ross, 1996; Peterson & Heilbronner,

1987~

Stewart et at, 1997; Taylor, 1996; TeIch et aI., 1989; Wardle et aI., 1990; Zinbarg et al,
1997), rather than three. Unlike the ASP, which has an adequate number of items to
identifY the respiratory, cardiovascular, and gastrointestinal factors, the ASI has only 2
items related to cardiovascular fears, one item related to respiratory fears, and 2 items
related to gastrointestinal fears. As stated earlier, internal consistency reliability is a
necessary part of factor identification, and it is impossible to compute with a one-item
scale. Due to the fact that score ranges are so limited, the possible value of correlations
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with other variables is reduced. In turn, validity coefficients are reduced (Betz, 1995). It
is of interest to note that when the ASI was expanded to include more items assessing
cardiovascular and respiratory fears (ASI-R; Taylor & Cox, 1998), they both became
distinct factors.
Another finding that is consistent with the findings of Taylor and Cox (1998), but
differs from previously mentioned analyses of the ASI, is additional evidence suggesting
that the fear of physiological sensations consists of three distinct factors: fears of cardiac,
respiratory, and gastrointestinal symptoms. The evidence consists of the large
correlations of the ASP subscales for these three fears with the fuJI ASI score. This
provides proof of convergent validity with a well-documented measure of anxiety
sensitivity (i.e., the ASI). To support this evidence, as stated earlier, convergent validity
provided by large correlations of these subscales with the ASI, as well as discriminant
validity provided by a modest correlation of these subscales with the trait portion of the
STAI, provide evidence for construct validity of these subscales (Kazdin, 1998).
Also consistent with the Taylor and Cox study (1998) are the highest and lowest
subscale correlations of the ASP and STAI. The highest correlation for both studies was
between the fear of cognitive dyscontrol subscale and the STAI Possibly this is due to
the fact that trait anxiety, which is assessed by the trait version ofthe STAI, is now
viewed as a higher-order or third-order construct indicative of an individual who tends to
experience fear in response to stressors (Lilienfeld et aI., 1993). It is probable that the
fear of cognitive dyscontrol would be more highly correlated with the tendency to
experience fear in response to stressors. Problems with focus and concentration that
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occur with elevated anxiety would also be stressors. Anxiety sensitivity, on the other
hand, is indicative of an individual who tends specifically to experience fear in response
to his or her own anxiety symptoms. Individuals who tend to experience fear in response
to stressors do not necessarily fear a rapid heart beat, a change in breathing, or the
gastrointestinal distress that can be experienced with anxiety. It follows that fears which
are specific to anxiety sensitivity (physiological fears), a separate construct, would have
lower correlations with a measure of trait anxiety, as they do in the current study and in
Taylor and Cox (1998).
As reported earlier, the fear of cognitive dyscontrol has also been found to have a
significant correlation with depression in earlier studies, while physiological fears had a
significant relationship only with anxiety sensitivity (Schmidt et at, 1997; Zinbarg et at.,
2001). Zinbarg et al. (2001) assessed fear responses to hyperventilation and 5.5% carbon
dioxide challenges based on a previous study (Rapee et aI., 1992). They found that the
strongest positive linear relation with panic-related phenomena among the 3 underlying
factors of the ASI was shown by Anxiety Sensitivity-Physical Concerns. They also found
that the strongest positive linear relation with depressed mood was shown by Anxiety
Sensitivity-Mental Incapacitation (i.e., fear of cognitive dyscontrol). It would be
interesting in future research to assess the effect of improvements in focus and
concentration on other symptoms of depression and anxiety.
As for the correlations between the ASP subscales, with the exception of the high
correlation between cardiovascular and respiratory fears in the current study, correlations
between the four identified factors (i.e., cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, and
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cognitive dyscontrol fears) in Cox and Taylor (1998) and the same subsales in the current
study were somewhat matched. These factors had relationships in the modest range in
Taylor and Cox (1998) and occupied the lower end in the current study (i.e., modest to
large range). These relationships tend to be fears that are not a fear of the same result.
For example, the fear of death due to a heart attack (i.e., cardiovascular fear) or
suffocation (respiratory fear) is not the same result as the fear of illness linked to
gastrointestinal distress or the fear of mental incapacitation due to problems with
concentration or focus.
Finally, the coefficients of determination in both the current study and in Taylor
and Cox (1998) for the ASP and ASI total scores were consistent. In both studies almost
half of the variance in the ASI total scores can be accounted for by variability in the ASP
total scores. It is likely that this common variance consists in part of the anxiety
sensitivity factor and some of the underlying factors (I.e., the fear of cognitive dyscontrol
and the fear of observable anxiety symptoms in the ASI and the ASP, the fear of physical
sensations in the ASI, and cardiovascular, respiratory, and gastrointestinal fears in the
ASP). It is also possible that common method variance plays a role. This is often the
case when different subjects are used, and all the measures completed by the same
informant show a similar level of correlation (Kazdin, 1995).
On the other hand, slightly over half of the variability in the ASI total scores was
unaccounted for by ASP total scores in both studies. A small part of this was accounted
for by the variability in the STAI total scores. It is likely that another portion is
accounted for by the relationships with the higher order personality dimensions.
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Neuroticism (Eysenck, 1991) is moderately to highly related to the measures of anxiety
sensitivity, according to studies reviewed by Lilienfeld (1999; Arrindell, 1993; Zinbarg &
Barlow, 1996; Saviotti et aI., 1991). A significant relationship has been found for the ASI
and the higher order dimension of Constraint (Telegen, 1978, 1982; Telegen & Waller,
1994). Significant relationships have been found for the ASP and avoidance of harm, a
lower order trait of Constraint (Van der Does et aI., 2003) and anxiety sensitivity and
Absorption, the tendency to become engrossed in sensory experiences (Lilienfeld, 1996;
Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). It is also likely that the differences found in the existence of
underlying factors of the ASP and the AS! account for another portion of the variability
(i.e., the identification of three specific physiological concerns in the ASP vs. one
inclusive factor for physical concerns in the ASI; the identification of the
dissociation/neurological concerns factor in the ASP).
Another possible cause is the difference in approaches that are used in the test
instructions. In the ASI the instructions suggest that individuals answer on the basis of
the way each person thinks he or she might feel if he or she had such an experience (i.e.,
conditional wordings for instructions and questions). In the ASP it is suggested that
individuals answer on the basis of the likelihood that if each person experienced a
sensation that it would lead to something bad happening to him or her. Also, as pointed
out earlier, a few of the items in the ASI refer to anxiety symptoms in a general manner
(e.g., It scares me when I am nervous; Cox, 1996). All of the items in the ASP are
specific to one of the six domains identified in earlier studies of anxiety sensitivity
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(Taylor, 1996). And finally, the number of items was increased drastically from 16 to 60
(Van der Does et aI., 2003).
In addition, in the coefficient of detennination, there is a small difference between

the current study and the Taylor and Cox study (1998) in the variability which was
unaccounted for by the correlation between ASI and ASP total scores. It is possible that
this difference is accounted for by the difference in the range of scores which is
connected to the identification of the two factors, fear of observable anxiety symptoms
and dissociative and neurological fears that were not identified in Cox and Taylor (1998).
These two factors were in fact identified by Van der Does et a1. (2003) in factor analysis
of the ASP.

Divergent Findings

Two results were higher than those found in most studies that have utilized the
ASI. As reported earlier, the mean score on the ASI is high in relationship to the mean
score on the ASI in most studies (e.g., Blais et aI., 2001; Stewart, et aI., 2001; Taylor,
1995; Zinbarg, et aI., 1997). This score is important in validating the range of this
study'S clinical subjects. It is also possible that it could be an artifact of the high rate of
comorbidity in this sample. This could also explain the somewhat higher mean total
scores for the ASP in the current study in comparison with the mean total scores for the
ASP in Van der Does et aI., (2003). The second result, the correlation of the trait version
of the STAI and the ASI in the current study, is also somewhat higher in comparison with
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other studies (Taylor, 1996). It remains in the modest range, supporting the view that
anxiety sensitivity and trait anxiety are correlated, but distinct constructs. It is also
possible that this result, as well, is an artifact of the high rate of comorbidity in this
sample. In fact, Otto et aI. (1995), Peterson and Reiss (1987), Schmidt et ai. (1997) and
Taylor et aI. (1996) have reported increased ASI scores in patients with major depression.
Two additional findings are of note. The two ASP subscales, that measured the
fear of publicly observable symptoms and dissociative/neurological fears, had
correlations with the ASI total score which were as strong as the other subscales. This
provides evidence for convergent validity. In addition, the high Cronbach's alpha for the
fear of publicly observable symptoms subscale (.87) in this study diverges from two
earlier studies (Blais et aI., 2001; NUllllaly & Bernstein, 1994). Analysis with the ASI has
provided evidence that this factor has low reliability (.62; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996).
However, evidence for high reliability is provided when this fear is adequately assessed
with a 10-item scale as it was in this study with the ASP. Alpha is influenced by the
number of items in a scale and characteristically increases as the number of items
increases. The incremental improvements made by adding items to the scale may be
relatively large up to about 10 items (Shrout & Yager, 1989; Switzer et aI., 1999). And
again, Cronbach's alpha, a coefficient of internal consistency, is a widely used reliability
statistic. As stated earlier, the recommended minimum is 0.80 and all the subscales of the
ASP easily met this requirement (Loewenthal, 2001).
Factor analysis perfonned by Taylor and Cox (1998) did not reveal that these two
subscales are factors. However, it was speculated that these two factors would be
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revealed when factor analysis is performed on a clinical sample assessed with the ASP.
Furthermore, it was speculated that this will be explained by the fact that the non-clinical
popUlation used by Taylor and Cox (1998) had a limited range of scores in comparison
with the scores of a clinical sample. The current study has provided evidence for two
criteria that are necessary for the identification of factors (i.e., internal consistency and
convergent validity). Additional evidence to support this speculation has been provided
in which these two subscales were identified as factors in factor analysis when the ASP
was utilized with a clinical sample (Van der Does et aI., 2003).
In further exploration of divergent findings regarding these two additional factors,
the results showed that not only all of the ASP subscales had large correlations with the
ASI, but the highest correlation in the current study involved the fear of publicly
observable anxiety reactions. It is possible that when utilizing a clinical sample, an
increase in cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, and cognitive dyscontrol fears is
accompanied by an increase in the fear that these anxiety reactions will be observable. In
addition, in Taylor and Cox (1998), the three somatic ASP subscales (i.e., fear of
cardiovascular, gastrointestinal and respiratory symptoms), that were identified as factors
in their study, had somewhat lower correlations with the ASI total score in comparison
with the current study. It is possible that the higher correlations for these subscales in the
current study are the result of an increased range of scores. This increased range of
scores also supports a stronger linear relationship.
When examining the correlational relationships between the ASP subscales, it is
notable that in the current study the relationship between cardiovascular and respiratory
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fears was very high and, in fact, had the highest relationship. This probably is due to the
fact that of all the subscales, these are the only two that have the same feared result (Le.,
death). In contrast, Taylor and Cox (1998) found a modest relationship for these two
factors, as they did for the others. This is probably due to the fact that a nonclinical
sample will not identify the same catastrophic outcome as often for a rapidly beating
heart or a change in respiration. The other correlational relationships in the current study
between the ASP subscales that occupied the higher end of the range consisted of
relationships between the fears of publicly observable anxiety reactions or dissociative
and neurological symptoms and the other subscales. It is probable that individuals with
anxiety sensitivity experience the fear that their anxiety symptoms will be observed as
they experience the fear of the anxiety symptoms. Therefore, there is a strong linear
relationship between these fears. The strong relationships between
dissociative/neurological fears, cardiovascular fears, and respiratory fears is probably due
to the likelihood that dissociation and light headedness are more likely to be experienced
with a higher level of autonomic arousal when the fear is more extreme (i.e., death). The
one correlation with dissociative/neurological fears that lies in the modest range is with
gastrointestinal fears. That is probably due to the likelihood that dissociation and light
headedness are less likely to be experienced when the expected result is less extreme (Le.,
illness) and autonomic arousal is not as high.
Finally, all of the six subscale relationships in the Van der Does et at. (2003)
study, that utilized a clinical sample, were large correlations. Their sample was assessed
at intake. It is likely that their subjects experienced, on average, a higher level of anxiety
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sensitivity symptoms than those in the current study because none had the benefits of
treatment. Therefore, it is speculated that there was an increased tendency for a stronger
linear relationship between the subscales that occupied the modest to lower end of the
large range in the current study (i.e., an increased tendency for one symptom to occur as
another symptom occurred due to co-occurrence of symptoms).

Contributions

The ASP was constructed by Taylor and Cox (1998) on the basis of their previous
research on the measurement of anxiety sensitivity (Cox et aI., 1996; Taylor et aI., 1992).
Each of its six to-item scales assesses a domain of anxiety sensitivity suggested by
previous studies (Taylor, 1996). The results of the current investigation provide evidence
with a clinical sample that all six scales have high levels of internal consistency
(Nunnally, 1978). As stated earlier, adequate measures (e.g., internal consistency) of a
given content domain (scale) are needed to determine whether or not the domain
corresponds to a distinct factor (Comrey, 1978). Internal consistency cannot be
established on one ofthe ASI scales (i.e., respiratory fears) since there is only one item
(Betz, 1995).
On the other hand, the ASr is a psychometrically well-documented measure of
anxiety sensitivity (Zinbarg et aI., 1997). Based on this fact, convergent validity for the
domains of the ASP was provided by each domain's significant correlation with the ASL
Evidence for internal consistency for the six ASP subscales and a large correlational
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relationship for all six scales with a well-documented measure of anxiety sensitivity
provide further evidence that the ASI contains too few items on some of the domains to
provide sufficient identification of all anxiety sensitivity factors.

Theoretical Implications

This study has provided evidence of convergent and discriminant validity with
both ASP total and subscale scores. This provides additional support for the view that the
general factor underlying the ASP total and subscale scores primarily reflects a unified
anxiety sensitivity construct rather than an artifact, or some other substantive construct,
such as trait anxiety (Loewenthal, 2001; Taylor & Cox, 1998; Zinberg et al., 1997). It is
important that this was accomplished with the use of measures that use similar
instructions and response scales to rule out such methodological differences as alternative
explanations for discriminant validity (Zinbarg et aI., 1997). Again, as reported
previously, it is interesting to note that the factor analysis performed by Van der Does et
al. (2003) suggested that the ASP is unidimensional. Nevertheless, they suggested that
there may be circumstances in which it is useful to distinguish the six dimensions as
originally proposed by Taylor and Cox (1998). The confirmatory factor analysis
performed by Van der Does et aL (2003) showed that this solution is defendable despite
high intercorrelations among factors.
Therefore, it can be argued that factor analysis with the ASP has begun to provide
full evidence to support multiple dimensions and hierarchic structure (Van der Does et
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aI.,2003). This study also takes necessary steps in that direction by providing evidence
for convergent and discriminant validity and high internal consistency when the ASP is
utilized with a clinical sample. In addition to providing additional evidence for the
anxiety sensitivity construct, it has also provided evidence for the identification of factors
that are not identified by the AS!. In fact, it has provided evidence for six factors. This in
turn adds to the evidence that raises doubt that AS meets the requirements of the second
criterion for expectancy theory. According to this criterion, as long as anxiety sensitivity
cannot be reduced to more basic fears, it can be regarded as fundamental. The findings of
the current study support the view that in order for expectancy theory to explain the
nature of anxiety sensitivity as a construct, it will need further development that takes
into account this and other findings regarding more basic underlying fears (Taylor &
Fedoroff, 1999).

Research Implications

It is speculated that results of applied research will become more consistent

through the use of congruence (Cox, 1996; Rapee, 1994). It has been suggested in the
interactional model proposed by Cox (1996) that physiological concerns and the fear of
cognitive dyscontrol are specific risk factors for different anxiety reactions (e.g., heart
palpitations, rapid breathing, diarrhea, and decreased concentration). It is speculated that
construct validity and content validity (i.e., an adequate identification of the underlying
domains) for anxiety sensitivity provided with the ASP will support the application of
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congruency. Congruency means that anxiety sensitivity interacts with congruent triggers,
but not with incongruent triggers, to produce catastrophic thoughts and related panic. For
example, the fear of cardiac symptoms interacts with the fear of heart palpitations, but not
with incongruent triggers such as derealization, to produce anxiety and panic (Cox,
1996). The use of congruence will come about as design and assessment strategies
abandon the unidimensional perception of panic and increasingly adopt the
multidimensional perspective. The prediction of an improvement in accuracy in panic
disorder research can be tested with a psychometrically solid multidimensional measure
of anxiety sensitivity (e.g.,

ASP~

Le., when there is improved accuracy in matching the

symptoms caused by a provocation task and the symptoms a person fears, precision in
predicting panic attacks will

improve~

Cox,

1996~

Cox et aI., 1999).

Applied research will also benefit from improved identification of the role that
anxiety sensitivity plays in the other anxiety disorders (i.e., post traumatic stress disorder,
social phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and specific
phobia). It is speculated that construct validity for the underlying domains of the ASP
supports its utilization in the identification of the domains that are related to the other
anxiety disorders. This suggests that the ASP can be utilized to identify the domains
underlying anxiety sensitivity that contribute to the association with the other anxiety
disorders. For example, as reported earlier, some studies show that ASI scores are almost
as elevated in post traumatic stress disorder as they are in panic disorder (Taylor et aI.,
1992~

Taylor et al., 1999). However, the possibility that the fear of cognitive dyscontrol
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is the domain that is most highly associated with post traumatic stress disorder cannot be
reliably supported due to the psychometric limitations of the AS!.
There are several other studies in which ASI scores have been found to be close
to, or even higher in social phobia, than those for panic disorder (Asmundson & Stein,
1994; Ball et aI., 1995; Hazen et al. 1995; Maidenberg et aI., 1996; Marks et a1., 1988).
A different pattern of item responding has been suggested for social phobia, in
comparison with that of panic disorder, with significantly higher scores on three items:
(a) "It is important to me not to appear nervous," (b) "It embarrasses me when my
stomach growls," and (c) «Other people notice when I feel shaky," (Cox et aI., 1999). It
is possible in social phobia, that the individuals who experience these symptoms may fear
publicly observable anxiety symptoms (e.g., sweating, blushing, trembling), if they
believe that these symptoms have hannful social consequences (Cox et aI., 1999). As
reported earlier, it is important, in different clinical situations, to seek further clarification
about the nature of anxiety sensitivity through item-level or dimensional analyses in order
to settle such issues (Cox et at, 1999). Initial evidence now exists that the ASP has the
psychometric properties for these procedures.
The diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder
are two areas that have received less attention in systematic research (e.g., item level
comparisons, factor analysis). However, some studies have provided evidence for
elevated anxiety sensitivity scores (Calamari et aI., 1996; Taylor et aI., 1992; Zeitlin &
McNally, 1993). While it is not known whether or not unique ASI patterns of responding
would also be fotmd for these disorders, the fear of cognitive dyscontrol would probably
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be most associated with these diagnoses. Assessment of these groups will benefit from
utilization of the ASP, which has the addition of more cognitive dyscontrol items that are
related to worry and intrusive thoughts and images (Cox et aI., 1999).

Applied Implications

Research findings are more likely to be externally valid when the samples of
individuals are representative of the population to which the results are to be generalized.
That is more often true of correlational studies, which are more generalizable to real-life
situations, than of experiments which involve greater control over extraneous variables
(Aiken, 1996). By necessity, the sample used in this investigation was highly
representative of the population with which the ASP can be utilized. Slightly less than a
third were diagnosed as having a single anxiety disorder, one third had comorbid anxiety
disorders, and somewhat more than a third had anxiety disorders comorbid with other
Axis I disorders. Given this wide distribution, it is probable that utilization of the ASP is
generalizable to a clinical population. It is speculated that evidence of construct validity
for the domains has positive ramifications for prevention, treatment, and maintenance of
treatment affects. Those at risk can be identified and given brief cognitive-behavioral
therapy as a preventive intervention. With adequate assessment using the ASP subscale
scores (Zinbarg et aI., 1997), treatment can target congruent cognitions. Those with
elevated anxiety sensitivity at the end of treatment can receive further interventions.
These will be aimed specifically at the identified risk factors for symptom relapse. It has
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been suggested that all of these were possible with the ASI (Zinbarg et aI., 1997).
However, with a psychometrically adequate number of items on each domain in the ASP
(i.e., internally consistent), there is a significant increase in the possibility that each
individual's fears will be adequately identified. For example, assessment of clinical
groups who experience the symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder and generalized
anxiety disorder are likely to benefit from the addition of more cognitive dyscontrol items
that are related to worry and intrusive thoughts and images (Cox et aI., 1999). Some
studies, although not all, have provided evidence that targeting congruent catastrophic
concerns improves treatment (Taylor, 1999). It is speculated that prevention, treatment,
and maintenance of treatment effects will be more effective due to an increase in accurate
and more thorough identification of each individual's concerns.
Another indicator that supports the future effectiveness of the ASP with a clinical
population was provided by the previously reported larger correlations between some of
the ASP subscales in the Van der Does et a1. (2003) study in comparison with the current
study. Since their sample was assessed at intake, it is likely that their subjects
experienced a higher level of anxiety sensitivity symptoms than those in the current study
because none had the benefits of treatment. Therefore, a larger range of scores produced
a stronger linear relationship in comparison with the current study, which contained
individuals who had not had the benefit of treatment, were in treatment, or had completed
treatment. Therefore, there is initial evidence that the ASP will accurately assess levels
of anxiety sensitivity not only prior to treatment, but during treatment, and at completion
of treatment, as well.
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Finally, there are additional issues for generalizability (i.e., age, educational level,
marital status, ethnicity, and employment status). Recent studies have indicated that
population characteristics such as the respondent's age, gender, education level, and
ethnicity can affect responses to items. These may lead to under-endorsement or overendorsement of items, biases in recalling events, and/or respondent difficulty in
interpreting questions (Switzer, 1999). The current investigation utilized a sample that
had a good age distribution of individuals from 19 to 65 years of age and good
distributions regarding educational levels, marital status, and employment status. While
the majority of participants were Caucasian, several other cultural/ethnic groups were
represented. The nature of the sample, evidence for convergent and discriminant validity
provided by the current investigation, and the care taken in assessment procedures (i.e.,
investigator present to provide support at all times during assessment) provide further
support for the use of the ASP with a varied clinical population.

Limitations

For this type of study a sample of 105 subjects meets the minimum requirement.
This presents limitations for generalizability since it limits the number of participants on
some of the disorders. The nature of the sample (Le., assessment at intake, during
treatment, post-treatment, and no treatment) causes the scores to be somewhat inaccurate.
That is to say that they do not provide an accurate reflection of each individual's level of
symptoms without the effects of treatment. However, the effect on the investigation's
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overall results is probably minimal. Another issue of generalizability, comorbidity with
other disorders, presents as a benefit for applied implications, but brings into question the
responses of the subjects and presents also as a limitation for generalizability.
The use of computers to aid in recording responses to both interviews and selfadministered questionnaires has become more prevalent, and seems to provide a reliable,
valid, and highly efficient means of assessing some attributes (e.g., Brugha, Kaul,
Dignon, Teather, & Willis, 1996; Dignon 1996; Erdman, Klein, Greist, & Skare, 1992;
Kobak, Reynolds, & Greist, 1993; Steer, Rissmiller, Ranieri, & Beck, 1994; Switzer et
aI., 1999; Thornicroft 1994). However, diagnosis could be questioned due to the fact that
a computerized version of the SCID-IIP was used. During the period of time in which
this software was utilized, psychometric properties had not been assessed. Therefore it is
possible that the use of this version increases the possibility of false positives and
negatives. In an effort to correct for this issue, when a subject was in treatment and
consented to a request for the chart diagnosis from the treatment provider, such a request
was made. Due to a lack of interest by subjects and treatment providers, only 29 chart
diagnoses were obtained. These were not enough to make a valid comparison between
chart diagnoses and diagnoses suggested by the computerized version of the SCID-IP.
Regarding discriminant validity, two measures may have no conceptual
connection or relationship, but still show significant and moderate-to-high correlations
because of common method variance. If method variance plays a significant role, as is
often the case when different subjects are used, then all the measures completed by the
same informant may show a similar level of correlation. In that case, it can be difficult to
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demonstrate discriminant validity (Kazdin, 1995). However, this was not the case
because the STAI scores in the current study were not higher. Discriminant validity
raises another issue, which is social desirability. It has been recommended (Campbell,
1960) that in validating a new measure, it should be correlated with measures of social
desirability, intelligence, and acquiescence. Such correlations would show that these
other constructs are not part of the new measure. These constructs have been shown to
have a pervasive influence across several domains. Also, their own construct validity is
relatively well established. Therefore, it is quite likely that they contribute to and
occasionally account for other new measures (Kazdin, 1995).

Suggestion

It is suggested that the ASP be shortened. Respondents may be reluctant to

complete a lengthy questionnaire, both because of the time involved and perceptions that
they will be asked to give confidential or sensitive types of information. Groups
receiving medical or psychiatric treatment, for example, depending on the nature or
severity of their illnesses, may have more difficulty in completing certain types of
assessments such as self-administered questionnaires (Switzer et al., 1999). Van der
Does et al. (2003) evaluated a considerably shortened version consisting of 24 items.
They used the rationale that each of the subscales has some items that are almost
identical. For instance, the following 3 items belong to the respiratory fears subscale: (1)
you feel like you're not getting enough air; (2) you feel like you can't breathe properly,
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and (3) you feel out of breath even though you haven't been exerting yourself. They also
suggested that a factor consisting of these items may be regarded as a semantic cluster
with little psychological significance. Because all items of the current 60-item ASP were
found to have high intercorrelations, Van der Does et a1. (2003) simply included the first
four items of each subscale. They found that each ofthe six shortened subscales had very
high correlations with its full-length version. In addition, the internal consistencies (i.e.,
Cronbach's alpha) of the 4-item scales were good. Their short ASP consists of items 1
through 19,21 through 24, and 27 of the 60-item ASP. The results of the corrected itemsubscale total score correlations in the current study, which were generally high,
suggested that no items were indicated for removal due to low correlations.

Suggestions for Future Studies

Analysis of internal consistency and correlations of the measure under
investigation with other instruments and variables with which the measure is expected to
have certain relationships provide evidence for construct validity (Aiken, 1996). To
provide additional evidence of construct validity for the ASP and verification of the
hierarchical structure of the ASP, the design used by Cox and Taylor (1998) needs to be
replicated with clinical samples and the inclusion of a confirmatory factor analysis
(Switzer et aI., 1999). The extent of the variance attributable to the group factors and to
the general factor in relationships with criterion variables can then be estimated. This can
be accomplished with the use of analyses of partial variance. In treatment studies, the
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ASP sub scale scores that correspond to treatment group factors, as well as total scores,
can be analyzed for relationships with criterion variables (e.g., ASI, BSQ, ACQ). These
analyses will be important for predictive validity of the ASP, including panic provocation
responses, clinical course, and treatment response, and will provide evidence of the
clinical usefulness of the ASP subscales and total scores (Zinbarg et at, 1997). Of
course, the shortened ASP and the ASI should also be compared in a single study (Van
der Does et aI., 2003), because it is considered the gold standard. The usefulness of the
shortened ASP may be further evaluated by investigating the predictive power of ASP
scores in different challenge paradigms (Van der Does et al., 2003).
When launching an investigation, decisions about instrumentation often take into
consideration the utility of making comparisons across studies or with normative
samples. If it is desirable to make such normative comparisons, it will be critical to
utilize a measure that has been used extensively in other populations (Switzer, 1999).
Taylor and Cox (1998) and Van der Does et al. (2003) have provided initial comparisons
with normative samples for the ASP. Such investigations should be continued, as wel1 as
initiated with the shortened ASP.
It is important and interesting to continue the assessment of structural

relationships among the dimensions of the DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders and the
dimensions of negative affect, the personality domains of Neuroticism, Absorption,
Constraint and its underlying factor, avoidance of harm, trait anxiety, anxiety sensitivity,
and depression. Research models which connect depression, anxiety disorders, negative
and positive affect, and autonomic arousal (Brown et aI., 1998), and anxiety sensitivity,
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panic, and depressed mood, (Zinbarg et aI., 2001) have been proposed and supported with
the results of research that use new research designs and statistical modeling techniques.
The current study provides evidence, utilizing the ASP, for the relationship between trait
anxiety, anxiety sensitivity, and six underlying factors. Future studies, that continue
assessment of structural relationships, need to consider use of the ASP, since there is now
evidence that it appears to be an instrument that is superior to the ASI in assessing the
anxiety sensitivity construct.
Another important issue to consider is the cultural appropriateness of the
instrument for the study population. Most instruments used in social and behavioral
research are based on middle-class, Western European/North American assumptions,
values, and norms, and may not be entirely appropriate for other cultural groups (Switzer,
1999). For example, many of the classic symptoms of schizophrenia as defined by the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM; American Psychiatric Association 1994;
e.g., delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech) are part of the religious ceremonies
or daily spiritual experiences of many cultural groups (Eaton, 1980). Culture-bound
assumptions may pervade virtually all mental and physical health instruments. The
current study included several cultural/ethnic groups and procedural efforts supported the
successful use of the ASP with the individuals of those groups. Nonetheless, it is
important that pilot studies target cultural/ethnic groups with whom the ASP will be
utilized in a clinical setting in order to ensure its successful use with those populations. If
there are differences in the characteristics of the ASP when it is applied to new
populations, there might be serious implications for construct validity. Divergent factor
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structures or internal consistency coefficients would imply that the ASP is not equivalent
across cultural groups. Differences among groups should be interpreted with caution.
These can be addressed by researchers in a variety of ways. For example, it may be
possible to identifY a different measure of the anxiety sensitivity construct that operates
similarly across the population groups of interest. Alternatively, items that are biased
may be eliminated or altered (Strommel, Given, Given, Kalaian, Schulz, & McCorkle,
1993; Switzer, 1999).
Other areas of future research include the relationship of anxiety sensitivity and
locus of control orientation (Bakker, Spinhoven, Van der Does, Van Balkom, Van Dyck,
2002) and continued questions about the overlap of anxiety sensitivity and pain, which
has been identified in some samples (Reiss & Havercamp, 1996, 1997). In the area of
etiology, if the ASP has indeed identified more accurately and fully the mechanisms
involved in anxiety sensitivity, future studies can use this information to decide whether
or not anxiety sensitivity factors are associated with specific patterns of environmental
and genetic influence (Taylor & Cox, 1998). Adults over the age of 65 have rarely been
included in research (Taylor, 1999). They were excluded from the current study due to
the possible effect of physical health status on responses to items (i.e., symptoms may
reflect medical status rather than emotional distress; Switzer et aI., 1999). The ASP
needs to be included in pilot studies to investigate its effectiveness with this population.
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Conclusion

This study has provided initial evidence with a clinical sample that the ASP and
its six domains have construct validity. This implies that the items in the ASP identifY
anxiety sensitivity and its underlying fears. It has provided necessary, although not
sufficient evidence that the ASP total score identifies a factor. In addition, it has provided
the same evidence that the six domains or subscales of the ASP also identifY factors.
These are important steps that support the concepts of multiple dimensions and hierarchic
structure. It is speculated that these theoretical concepts will prove to be meaningful and
important in practical applications, as well as in research, given the existing evidence for
common factors across depression and anxiety disorders.
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Appendix
ID#

ANXIETY SENSITMTY PROFILE

INSTRUCTIONS. It is very important that you read these instructions carefully so that you will be able
to answer the questions that follow. The purpose of this questiOlmaire is to measure your level of fear of
anxiety"related sensations. There are many anxiety-related sensations, including the following:
palpitations (pounding heart or accelerated heart rate), sweating, trembling, shortness of breath, chest pain
or discomfort, nausea, dizziness, feelings of unreality, chills, and hot flashes. People differ in their fears of
these sensations; some people have little or no fear, others have mild or moderately severe fears, while
others have very strong fears.

Anxiety sensations are feared if a person believes that these sensations have bad consequences. For
example, people are frightened of palpitations if they believe these sensations could lead to a heart attack.
People are frightened of dizziness if they believe that this sensation could mean that they are going crazy.
People are frightened of publicly observable anxiety reactions (e.g., blushing or trembling) if they believe
these reactions could cause others to ridicule or reject them.

We would like you to do two things for each of the items on the following pages:
1. Imagine that you are experiencing the sensation. Try to imagine this as vividly as possible.
2, Using the scale provided, rate the likelihood that if YOU experienced the sensation, it would lead to
something bad happening to YOII, such as dying, going crazy, losing control, or being ridiculed or rejected

by others. There are no right or wrong answers, and all responses will remain anonymous, Please note:
We are not assessing whether or not you experience these sensations as a result of being anxious, We want
to assess whether you believe that anxiety-related sensations would lead to something bad happening to
you.

Practice item:
Imagine that you're experiencing the following sensation. What is the likeJibood that this sensation
would LEAD to something BAD happening to YOU? Circle the number that best indicates your choice:
Not likely Somewhat Likely Extremely
likely
O. Your legs feel unsteady,

1

2

3

4

5

6

Before you answer the following questions, please pLace a checkmark here if you fully understand the
instructions you have read: ~_ _,
[fyou don't understand the instlUctions, please ask for clarification.

7
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What is the likelihood that this sensation would LEAD to something BAD happening to YOU?
Notal aU
likely

Somewhat
likely

Extremely
likely

1. Your heart is pounding

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. Your thoughts seem slower than usual

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Your stomach is making loud noises

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. You have tingling sensations in your hands

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. You have pain in your chest

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. Your thoughts seemjwnWed

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. Your heart is beating so loud that you can hear it

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. You feel like you're in a fog

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

11. You have diarrhea

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. You are 'Jumpy" or easily stllrtled

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. You keep getting distracted by unwanted thoughts

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. Your heart beats rnpidly

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. You feel like you're suffocating

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. You have a knot ill your stomach

2

3

4

5

6

7

L7. You feel numb all over

2

3

4

5

6

7

18. Thoughts seem to faee through your mind

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. You feel out of breath even though you haven't
been exerting yourself

2

3

4

5

6

7

20. Your heart pOlmds in your ears

2

3

4

5

6

7

21. You feel like something is stuck in your throat

2

3

4

5

6

7

22. Your body feels strange or ditTerent in some way

2

3

4

5

6

7

23. Your faee sweats even though you're not hot

2

3

4

5

6

7

24. Your voice quavers (trembles or sounds shaky)

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. You feel like you can't take a deep breath

10. Hot flushes sweep over you

1

1

165

Anxiety Sensitivity: Validity of the ASP
What is the likeJillood that this sensation would LEAD to something BAD happening to YOU?
Somewhat
likely

Not at aU
likely

Extremely
likely

25. You can't keep your mind on II task

2

3

4

5

6

7

26. You have difficulty swallowing

2

3

4

5

6

7

27. Your stomach aches

2

3

4

5

6

7

28. You have bumillg sensations in your chest (heartbum)

2

3

4

5

6

7

29. Familiar surroundings seem strange or unreal to you

2

3

4

5

6

7

30. You feel like you're choking

2

3

4

5

6

7

31. You feel your heartbeat pulsing in your neck

2

3

4

5

6

7

32. You are constipated

2

3

4

33. You feel faint or lightheaded

2

3

4

5

6

7

34. Your heart starts beating slower

2

3

4

5

6

7

35. You shiver even though you're not cold

2

3

4

5

6

7

36. You have trouble thinking clearly

2

3

4

5

6

7

37. You feel that there's a lump in your throat

2

3

4

5

6

7

38. You feel like you're about to vomit

2

3

4

5

6

7

2

3

4

5

6

7

40. Your stomach is upset

2

3

4

5

6

7

4 L You have trouble remembering things

2

3

4

5

6

7

42. Your heart beats erratically

2

3

4

5

6

7

43. You have tingling sensations in your lips

2

3

4

5

6

7

44. Your mind goes blank

2

3

4

5

6

7

45. Your throat feels tight

2

3

4

5

6

7

46. You feel "spacey" or spaced out

2

3

4

5

6

7

47. You fcel like you're not getting enough air

2

3

4

5

6

7

48. Your face brushes red

2

3

4

5

6

7

39. You're awake but feel like you're in II daze

1

6

5

7
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What is the likelihood that this sensation would LEAD to something BAD happening to YOU?
Not at all

Somewhat

Extremely

likely

likely

likely

49. You feel bloated (gassy)

2

3

4

5

6

7

50. You feel sick in your stomach (nausea)

2

3

4

5

6

7

5 L Your heart skips a beat

2

3

4

5

6

7

52. Your face feels numb

2

3

4

5

6

7

53. The muscles in your face twitch

2

3

4

5

6

7

54, You are easily distracted

2

3

4

5

6

7

55, Yourchcstfeelstight

2

3

4

5

6

7

56, You have difficulty concentrating

2

3

4

5

6

7

57, You have to urinate more frequently than usual

2

3

4

5

6

7

58, Your hands are trembling

2

3

4

5

6

7

59, You feel like YOll can't breathe properly

2

3

4

5

6

7

60, You feel like things are spinn)ng around you (vertigo)

2

3

4

5

6

7
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